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Abstract
This paper explores the heterogeneity across firms within each sector and region in 
the impact of and response to the COVID-19 shock. It relies on a survey conducted by 
Banco de España to 4,004 companies in November 2020 matched to very rich balance-
sheet information on firm characteristics. According to our results, the impact of the 
COVID-19 shock was larger in the case of small, young and less productive firms located 
in urban areas within each sector-region pair. Moreover, these firms resorted relatively 
more to public-guaranteed loans, tax deferrals, and furlough schemes (ERTEs). More 
indebted companies, which were not hit relatively harder by the shock, also perceived 
public-guaranteed loans as very useful. Firms consider that uncertainty represents a key 
hindrance to the recovery, but observable characteristics do not explain the variation 
in the perception of uncertainty once the impact of the shock is accounted for. Finally, 
we use the announcement of the Pfizer vaccine on November 9th 2020 as a natural 
experiment to provide evidence that the vaccine announcement increased significantly 
firms’ subjective recovery expectations.
Keywords: COVID-19, firms, sales, employment, uncertainty.
JEL classification: D22, L20, L25.
Resumen
Este artículo explora la heterogeneidad del impacto y la respuesta a la crisis del 
COVID-19 de las empresas españolas dentro de una misma región y sector. Los datos 
utilizados se basan en una encuesta realizada por el Banco de España a 4.004 empresas 
en noviembre de 2020, que cruzamos con información de los estados financieros de las 
empresas procedente de la Central de Balances del Banco de España. Los resultados 
muestran que la facturación y el empleo descendieron más en las empresas pequeñas, 
jóvenes y menos productivas localizadas en áreas urbanas. En el caso del empleo, 
una mayor ratio de temporalidad se encuentra asociada a mayores descensos de 
la ocupación. Además, estas empresas perciben los avales ICO, el aplazamiento 
de impuestos y los ERTE como herramientas útiles para mitigar los efectos de la actual 
crisis sanitaria. Las empresas más endeudadas también percibieron como muy útiles 
los avales ICO, pese a no haber sufrido relativamente más por esta perturbación. Las 
empresas consideran que la incertidumbre es uno de los principales factores que ha 
condicionado de forma negativa su actividad, pero las características observadas 
no pueden explicar la variación en la percepción de la incertidumbre una vez que se 
controla por la caída de las ventas. Finalmente, usamos el anuncio de la efectividad de la 
vacuna de Pfizer realizado el 9 de noviembre de 2020 como un experimento natural para 
mostrar que dicha noticia incrementó de forma significativa las expectativas subjetivas 
de recuperación de las empresas. 
Palabras clave: COVID-19, empresas, ventas, empleo, incertidumbre.
Códigos JEL: D22, L20, L25.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 7 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2120
1 Introduction
The global spread of the COVID-19 is having a significant human toll and repre-
sents an unprecedented shock for the economy, pushing most economies into recession.
One of the most salient features of the virus-induced economic crisis is the asymmetry
along several dimensions. Although a pandemic represents a text-book example of an
ex-ante exogenous and symmetric shock, the actions taken by agents and policymakers
have resulted in very different economic effects across sectors and regions/countries.1 This
is so because the scope of social-distancing measures depend on the social interaction in-
tensity by sector of activity as well as the severity of the pandemic by region. While this
heterogeneity is well-documented, much less is known about the asymmetric effects across
firms within each sector and region. The purpose of this paper is to shed light on this
issue. In particular, we investigate the heterogeneity of several aspects of the COVID-19
shock across firms: its impact on sales and employment, the firms’ responses to mitigate
the shock, their use of available policy instruments, and the main factors hindering firms’
activity during the pandemic.
To this purpose, we use more than 4,000 responses to a new firm-level survey
launched by Banco de España, the so-called EBAE (Encuesta Banco de España sobre
Actividad Empresarial in Spanish). A unique feature of this survey is that we can use the
firm identifier to match it to Central de Balances, a firm level data set that contains cash
flow and balance sheet information of the quasi-universe of Spanish firms. Therefore, we
can investigate the impact of and response to the shock on the basis of the responses to
the survey and depending on firms’ ex-ante characteristics. There are several advantages
of this matched data. First, some of the key variables for our analysis can only obtained
in surveys such as the EBAE, as they are not observed in administrative data. This is
the case, for instance, of timely information on business activity at the firm level, partic-
ularly for SMEs, information about firms’ expectations about future developments, their
evaluation of various policy instruments and their perception of the degree of uncertainty.
Second, matching this survey data with balance sheet data allows us to exploit (exoge-
nous) pre-crisis differences in a large set of firms’ characteristics, arguably with a higher
degree of accuracy, and some of which would be hard to elicit from survey data, such as
1Conceptually, the COVID-19 shock involves simultaneous disruptions to both supply and demand.
On the supply side, some workplaces and businesses are shut down to halt the spread of the virus. On the
demand side, households are less willing to leave their homes, either because of mobility restrictions or
the fear of getting infected, which depresses consumption. Moreover, the fall in demand could be further
exacerbated by the increase in unemployment resulting from the supply shocks highlighted above, which
represent the so-called Keynesian supply shocks in Guerrieri et al. (2020).
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Total Factor Productivity (TFP).
In particular, we exploit within-sector-region variation so that identification comes
from differences across firms operating in the same sector and the sa e region. Armed
with this data and identification strategy, we ai to answer four main questions: (i)
what the heterogeneous impact of the COVID-19 shock on firms’ turnover is; (ii) what
firms’ responses to this shock are; (iii) which policy measures are deemed more useful by
fir s for sustaining their activity; (iv) whic factors affect firms’ activity the most, with
a special focus on firms’ recovery expectations and uncertainty.
Our first set of results indicates that the COVID-19 shock hit harder small, young
and less productive firms within each sector and region. As a consequence, many firms
needed to adjust their employment, both in the extensive margin (firing or hiring) and/or
in the intensive margin (temporary reduction in the staff thanks to the use of furlough
schemes - ERTEs). While firms with a larger share of temporary workers decreased more
their staff, firms that are larger, more productive and with more savings were able to
better sustain employment.
The second set of results refers to the ways firms have adjusted to the shock: restor-
ing to e-commerce, reducing investment, introducing teleworking, or firing workers (ex-
tensive margin of employment). Reduction in investment was the margin most used by
firms (38%), followed by the implementation of working from home schemes (32%), the
introduction of e-commerce (22%) and firing workers (18%). Working from home was
useful for urban, large and young firms, with high share of intangible assets and a large
share of permanent workers in their staff. E-commerce and the reduction of investment
was more useful for less productive firms. Finally, firing was more used by firms with a
large share of temporary workers. While firing of workers is not that widespread, effective
employment used decreased significantly, as explained in the previous paragraph. This
suggests that most of the adjustment in employment was done via the intensive margin
(furlough schemes- ERTEs), which are explored further below.
The third set of results explores the role of the COVID-19 policy measures in sus-
taining firms’ activity. Public guaranteed loans (ICOs) was the most useful measure, with
nearly 40% of the surveyed firms reporting this policy measure had been important for
sustaining activity. Furlough schemes (ERTEs) were important for 29% of the respon-
dents, and tax deferrals and renegotiation of rental payments were deemed useful by 24%
and 21% of the respondents, respectively. Turning to firm-level heterogeneity, smaller,
less productive, younger, and more indebted firms resorted more intensively to public
guaranteed loans (ICOs) and tax deferrals, while medium-sized and less productive firms
2
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 8 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2120
Total Factor Productivity (TFP).
In particular, we exploit within-sector-region variation so that identification comes
from differences across firms operating in the same sector and the same region. Armed
with this data and identification strategy, we aim to answer four main questions: (i)
what the heterogeneous impact of the COVID-19 shock on firms’ turnover is; (ii) what
firms’ responses to this shock are; (iii) which policy measures are deemed more useful by
firms for sustaining their activity; (iv) which factors affect firms’ activity the most, with
a special focus on firms’ recovery expectations and uncertainty.
Our first set of results indicates that the COVID-19 shock hit harder small, young
and less productive firms within each sector and region. As a consequence, many firms
needed to adjust their employment, both in the extensive margin (firing or hiring) and/or
in the intensive margin (temporary reduction in the staff thanks to the use of furlough
schemes - ERTEs). While firms with a larger share of temporary workers decreased more
their staff, firms that are larger, more productive and with more savings were able to
better sustain employment.
The second set of results refers to the ways firms have adjusted to the shock: restor-
ing to e-commerce, reducing investment, introducing teleworking, or firing workers (ex-
tensive margin of employment). Reduction in investment was the margin most used by
firms (38%), followed by the implementation of working from home schemes (32%), the
introduction of e-commerce (22%) and firing workers (18%). Working from home was
useful for urban, large and young firms, with high share of intangible assets and a large
share of permanent workers in their staff. E-commerce and the reduction of investment
was more useful for less productive firms. Finally, firing was more used by firms with a
large share of temporary workers. While firing of workers is not that widespread, effective
employment used decreased significantly, as explained in the previous paragraph. This
suggests that most of the adjustment in employment was done via the intensive margin
(furlough schemes- ERTEs), which are explored further below.
The third set of results explores the role of the COVID-19 policy measures in sus-
taining firms’ activity. Public guaranteed loans (ICOs) was the most useful measure, with
nearly 40% of the surveyed firms reporting this policy measure had been important for
sustaining activity. Furlough schemes (ERTEs) were important for 29% of the respon-
dents, and tax deferrals and renegotiation of rental payments were deemed useful by 24%
and 21% of the respondents, respectively. Turning to firm-level heterogeneity, smaller,
less productive, younger, and more indebted firms resorted more intensively to public
guaranteed loans (ICOs) and tax deferrals, while medium-sized and less productive firms
2
resorted more intensively to furlough schemes (ERTEs).
The fourth set of results shows which are the main factors affecting firms’ activity.
Pandemic and political uncertainty take the lead (80% and 77%), followed by the evolution
of demand (48%), unpaid receivables (34%) and competition pressures (33%), problems in
access to financing (17%), disruptions in supply chains (13%) and availability of workers
(10%). Due to the prominent role of uncertainty in this pandemic, we dig deeper into the
heterogeneity of this uncertainty across firms. However, once we account for the size of
the shock, observable firm characteristics cannot explain differences in the perception of
uncertainty.
Finally, we make use of the announcement of the Pfizer vaccine effectiveness on
November 9th 2020, right in the middle of the survey period, as a natural experiment
to compare the recovery expectations of firms that responded to the survey before and
after the announcement, and we find that this announcement improved significantly their
prospects of recovery. This finding puts forward evidence that during a pandemic firms
take into account medical developments when forming their expectations about economic
recovery.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. A brief overview of the literature
closes this introduction. Section 2 presents the survey details and the balance sheet data.
Section 3 presents the heterogeneity in the impact of the shock on turnover, and the reac-
tion of firms’ employment. Section 4.1 shows the heterogeneity of the firm level responses
to the shocks. Section 4.2 explores the heterogeneity in the use of the policy instruments
aimed at mitigating the negative consequences of the COVID-19 shock. Section 5 looks at
the main factors conditioning firms’ activity, with subsection 5.1 focusing on the impact
of uncertainty on firms’ activity. Section 6 shows causal evidence of the impact of the
vaccine announcement on firms’ recovery expectations. Section 7 concludes.
Literature review
The paper contributes to the flourishing literature studying the impact of COVID-19
on businesses. Although studies examining the impact of previous pandemics on business
activity are quite limited and typically focus on macroeconomic indicators (see Turner &
Akinremi (2020) for a review), a rapidly growing literature on the economic consequences
of COVID-19 and government response is emerging since the outbreak of the pandemic.
The closest papers to ours are those using survey data to understand the impact of
the COVID-19 shock on firms. Apedo-Amah et al. (2020) perform a survey focused on
3
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developing countries, and show that the COVID-19 shock has had persistent negative
impact on sales, but the response of employment has been mostly along the intensive
margin. Bartik et al. (2020) use survey data for the US to show that the pandemic
brought a significant proportion of closures, job cuts and a fragile financial situation of
firms. Bennedsen et al. (2020) use a large survey on small, medium and large Danish
firms and find evidence that firms using government aid were also those in the most need,
suggesting that support measures were effective in preserving employment. Bloom et al.
(2021) use a panel survey of 2,500 SMEs in the US, and document smallest offline firms
experienced sales drops of over 40% compared to less than 10% for the largest online
firms. Humphries et al. (2020) use survey data to assess the impact of targeted COVID-
19 policies on SMEs.2 Our paper differs from these papers in that we can match the
survey responses to very rich balance sheet data of firms, providing us with a variety
of firm-level heterogeneity dimensions to look at. Bloom et al. (2020) also match their
survey data to Amadeus database to discern the impact of the COVID-19 shock on TFP.
Our paper differs from theirs in that our sample is more representative, including small
and very small firms, and that we focus on the heterogeneous impact of the shock using
a broader set of heterogeneity measures, such as age, debt, cash holdings, etc. This is
also an important difference with respect to other readily available data sources, such as
Chetty et al. (2020), that analyze heterogeneity at group levels (area, industry, income
level, business size), but are not suitable for exploring heterogeneity in other dimensions,
such as productivity or indebtedness.
This paper is also related to the literature dealing with the impact of the COVID-19
shock on subjective perceptions and uncertainty. Altig et al. (2020) use several macroe-
conomic uncertainty indicators for the US and UK to show a huge uncertainty increase in
reaction to the pandemic, but with different peak amplitudes and time paths in these two
countries. One of their uncertainty measures also relies on subjective uncertainty mea-
sures computed from business expectation surveys, which shows that sales uncertainty
rose by more than 100%. Furthermore, Barrero & Bloom (2020) argue this huge increase
in uncertainty might be slowing the subsequent recovery and reducing the impact of policy
measures taken. Buchheim et al. (2020) show with a panel of German firms that firms that
perceived higher uncertainty, proxied by the perception of shutdown lasting longer, were
more likely to implement strong measures like layoffs or canceling investments. Our pa-
per contributes to this strand of literature by showing that, once the shock is accounted
2There is a growing number of papers using survey data to assess the impact of COVID-19 of firms,
which are not listed here for the sake of brevity.
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for, observable characteristics cannot explain any differences in perceived uncertainty.
Furthermore, we provide causal evidence of the impact of the vaccine announcement on
subjective firm level recovery expectations. On this front, our results complement those
of Heap et al. (2021), who find that the vaccine announcement decreased the trust in
government and elected politicians.
Finally, this paper is also related to the literature about the impact of COVID-19 on
firms at different margins: incumbent’s firm behaviour (Brotherhood & Jerbashian, 2020,
Barrero et al., 2020 ); liquidity needs, credit constraints and solvency of firms (Schivardi
& Guido, 2020, Balduzzi et al., 2020, Greenwald et al., 2020, Blanco et al., 2020), the
efficiency of policies implemented to mitigate the COVID-19 shock (Gonzalez-Uribe &
Wang, 2020, Goodhart et al., 2020, Zoller-Rydzek & Keller, 2020), the entry decision
(Sedlacek & Sterk, 2020, Albert et al., 2020), among many others.
2 Data
2.1 Survey details
The survey was launched by Banco de España in November 2020, the so-called
EBAE (Encuesta Banco de España sobre Actividad Empresarial), with the purpose of
monitoring Spanish non-financial corporations’ activity in real time. The participation
of companies is voluntary and responses were collected through a questionnaire sent to
firms by e-mail. The survey was carried during the fortnight between the 4th and 19th of
November 2020. The survey was submitted to a sample of 12,940 Spanish non-financial
corporations, and we received 4,004 valid responses, which represents a response rate of
30,9%. Figure 10 of Appendix A.1 shows the responses received by day.3 There is a slight
over-representation of some sectors (e.g. manufacturing) and large firms (see Appendix
A.1).
Survey responses aggregated at the sectoral and regional level capture well the recent
developments in the Spanish economy. For instance, even at a high degree of disaggre-
gation at regional or industry level, survey figures on employment growth are highly
correlated with those of other sources (see Figure 9 in Appendix A.1). It is worth high-
lighting that both the survey and this paper focus on the intensive margin, namely, the
performance of surviving firms.4
3The distribution of firms that received the survey, the distribution of firms that responded the survey,
and its comparison to aggregate data can be found on Appendix A.1.
4Indeed, non-responses to the survey may reflect companies that have closed permanently as a result
5
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of companies is voluntary and responses were collected through a questionnaire sent to
firms by e-mail. The survey was carried during the fortnight between the 4th and 19th of
November 2020. The survey was submitted to a sample of 12,940 Spanish non-financial
corporations, and we received 4,004 valid responses, which represents a response rate of
30,9%. Figure 10 of Appendix A.1 shows the responses received by day.3 There is a slight
over-representation of some sectors (e.g. manufacturing) and large firms (see Appendix
A.1).
Survey responses aggregated at the sectoral and regional level capture well the recent
developments in the Spanish economy. For instance, even at a high degree of disaggre-
gation at regional or industry level, survey figures on employment growth are highly
correlated with those of other sources (see Figure 9 in Appendix A.1). It is worth high-
lighting that both the survey and this paper focus on the intensive margin, namely, the
performance of surviving firms.4
3The distribution of firms that received the survey, the distribution of firms that responded the survey,
and its comparison to aggregate data can be found on Appendix A.1.
4Indeed, non-responses to the survey may reflect companies that have closed permanently as a result
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Questionnaire
The survey included a total of 8 questions, split into two parts. First, firms were
asked about their views on the current and future evolution of business turnover, employ-
ment, and input and output prices, as well the effect of some general factors affecting their
activity, such as the demand changes, access to external financing, supply disruptions or
economic uncertainty, among others. A second set of questions aimed to calibrate more
precisely the impact of and the response to the COVID-19 crisis. In particular, companies
were asked about the degree of uptake of support measures, how far from normal activity
levels they were, and how long it will take them to get back to normal. Appendix A.2
contains the full questionnaire, and in each of the following subsections we detail the
questions used.
2.2 Balance sheet data: Central de Balances Integrada
Data on firm-level responses to the survey is combined with information on firms’
characteristics that is available at a yearly frequency from the Central Balance Sheet Data
(CBI, Central de Balances Integrada), which is sourced from firms’ voluntary responses
to Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data Office (CBSO) surveys and the Spanish
Mercantile Registry data; the ultimate sources of the data are therefore the Banco de
España and the Spanish Mercantile and Property Registrars’ Association. This is an
administrative database that contains information on firms’ financial statements (required
by law to be submitted to the commercial registry) as well as on their income corporate
tax returns. The data covers around 90% of firms in the non-financial market economy
for all size categories, including both turnover and number of employees. The correlation
between micro-aggregated employment and output growth and the National Accounts
counterparts is above 0.90 (see Almunia et al. (2018) for more details). The approach of
matching CBI and survey data enables us to explore the role of firms’ characteristics, which
would be difficult to replicate in a survey, along several dimensions observed in the survey,
such as the impact of COVID-19 on turnover and employment, since this information is
only available in administrative registers with a sizable lag, firms’ perception of policies
to tackle the crisis and the degree of uncertainty about future developments. After the
match EBAE-CBI, we end up with 3,584 observations.
of the COVID-19 shock. With respect to the extensive margin and in line with our findings below for the
intensive margin, Social Security records shows that small firms have been hit harder by the COVID-19
shock: the number for firms with less than 49 employees decreased by -3.3% in 2020 while the fall in the
case of larger firms (>500 emp.) was only -1.4%.
6
for, o servable characteristics cannot explain any differences in perceived u certainty.
Furthermore, we provide causal evidence of he impact of the vaccine announcement on
subjective firm level recovery expectations. On thi front, our ul complement those
of Heap et al. (2021), who find that the vaccine announcement decreased the trust in
government and elected politicians.
Finally, this paper is also related to the literature about the impact of COVID-19 on
firms at diffe nt margins: incumbent’s firm behaviou (Brotherhood & J rbashian, 2020,
Barrero et al., 2020 ); liqu dity needs, credit constraints a d solvency of firms (Schiva di
& Guido, 2020, Balduzzi et al., 2020, Greenwald t al., 2020, Bla co et al., 2020), the
efficiency of policie implemented to mitigate the COVID-19 shock (Gonzalez-Uribe &
Wang, 2020, Goodhart et al., 2020, Zoller-Rydzek & K ller, 2020), the entry decision
(Sedlacek & Sterk, 2020, Albert et al., 2020), among many others.
2 Data
2.1 Survey details
The survey was launched by Banco de España in November 2020, the so-called
EBAE (Encuesta Banco de España sobre Actividad Empresarial), with the purpose of
monitoring Spanish non-financial corporations’ activity in real time. The participation
of companies is voluntary and responses were collected through a questionnaire sent to
firms by e-mail. The survey was carried during the fortnight between the 4th and 19th of
November 2020. The survey was submitted to a sample of 12,940 Spanish non-financial
corporations, and we received 4,004 valid responses, which represents a response rate of
30,9%. Figure 10 of Appendix A.1 shows the responses received by day.3 There is a slight
over-representation of some sectors (e.g. manufacturing) and large firms (see Appendix
A 1).
Survey responses aggregated at the sectoral and regional level capture well the recent
developments in the Spanish economy. For instance, even at a high degree of disaggre-
gation at regional or industry level, survey figures on employment growth are highly
correlated with those of other sources (see Figure 9 in Appendix A.1). It is worth high-
lighting that both the survey and this paper focus on the intensive margin, namely, the
performance of surviving firms.4
3The distribution of firms that received the survey, the distribution of firms that responded the survey,
and its comparison to aggregate data can be found on Appendix A.1.
4Indeed, non-responses to the survey ay reflect companies that have closed permanently as a result
5
Questionnaire
The survey included a total of 8 questions, split into two parts. First, firms were
asked about their views on the current and future evolution of business turnover, employ-
ment, and input and output prices, as well the effect of some general factors affecting their
activity, such as the demand changes, access to external financing, supply disruptions or
economic uncertainty, among others. A second set of questions aimed to calibrate more
precisely the impact of and the response to the COVID-19 crisis. In particular, companies
were asked about the degree of uptake of support measures, how far from normal activity
levels they were, and how long it will take them to get back to normal. Appendix A.2
contains the full questionn i , an in each of the following subsec ions we detail the
questions used.
2 Balance sheet data: Central de Balances Integrada
Data on firm-level responses to the survey is combined with information on firms’
characteristics that is available at a yearly frequency fro the Central Balanc Sheet Data
(CBI, Central de Balances I tegrada), which is sourced from firms’ voluntary res onses
to Banco d España Central Balance Sheet Data Office (CBSO) survey and the Spanish
Mercantile Registry data; the ultimate sources of the data are therefore the Banco de
España and the Spanish Merc ntile and Property Registrars’ Association. This is an
adminis rative databas that contains information on firms’ financial statements (required
by law to be submitted to the commercial regi try) a well as on their incom corporate
tax retu ns. The data cov r ar und 90% of firms in the non-financial mark t economy
for all size c tegories, inclu ing both turnover and number of employees. The correlation
between mic o-aggregated mployment and output growth and the Nationa Accounts
counterparts is above 0.90 (se Almunia et al. (2018) for more details). Th appro ch of
matching CBI a d su vey da a enables us to explore the role of firms’ characteristics, which
would b difficul to replicat in a survey, alon several dimensions observed in the survey,
such as t e impact of COVID-19 on turnover and employment, since this infor ation is
only available in adm istrative registers with a sizable lag, firms’ perception of policies
to tackle the crisis and the degree of uncertainty about future developments. After the
match EBAE-CBI, we end up with 3,584 observations.
of the COVID-19 shock. With respect to the extensive margin and in line with our findings below for the
intensive margin, Social Security records shows that small firms have been hit harder by the COVID-19
shock: the number for firms with less than 49 employees decreased by -3.3% in 2020 while the fall in the
case of larger firms (>500 emp.) was only -1.4%.
6
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 12 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2120
Questionnaire
The survey included a total of 8 questions, split into two parts. First, firms were
asked about their views on the current and future evolution of business turnover, employ-
ment, and input and output prices, as well the effect of some general factors affecting their
activity, such as the demand changes, access to external financing, supply disruptions or
economic uncertainty, among others. A second set of questions aimed to calibrate more
precisely the impact of and the response to the COVID-19 crisis. In particular, companies
were asked about the degree of uptake of support measures, how far from normal activity
levels they were, and how long it will take them to get back to normal. Appendix A.2
contains the full questionnaire, and in each of the following subsections we detail the
questions used.
2.2 Balance sheet data: Central de Balances Integrada
Data on firm-level responses to the survey is combined with information on firms’
characteristics that is available at a yearly frequency from the Central Balance Sheet Data
(CBI, Central de Balances Integrada), which is sourced from firms’ voluntary responses
to Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data Office (CBSO) surveys and the Spanish
Mercantile Registry data; the ultimate sources of the data are therefore the Banco de
España and the Spanish Mercantile and Property Registrars’ Association. This is an
administrative database that contains information on firms’ financial statements (required
by law to be submitted to the commercial registry) as well as on their income corporate
tax returns. The data covers around 90% of firms in the non-financial market economy
for all size categories, including both turnover and number of employees. The correlation
between micro-aggregated employment and output growth and the National Accounts
counterparts is above 0.90 (see Almunia et al. (2018) for more details). The approach of
matching CBI and survey data enables us to explore the role of firms’ characteristics, which
would be difficult to replicate in a survey, along several dimensions observed in the survey,
such as the impact of COVID-19 on turnover and employment, since this information is
only available in administrative registers with a sizable lag, firms’ perception of policies
to tackle the crisis and the degree of uncertainty about future developments. After the
match EBAE-CBI, we end up with 3,584 observations.
of the COVID-19 shock. With respect to the extensive margin and in line with our findings below for the
intensive margin, Social Security records shows that small firms have been hit harder by the COVID-19
shock: the number for firms with less than 49 employees decreased by -3.3% in 2020 while the fall in the
case of larger firms (>500 emp.) was only -1.4%.
6
For each firm, among other variables, we observe the firm’s sector of activity (4-digit
NACE Rev. 2 code), location (5-digit zip code), turnover, material expenditures, number
of employees, share of temporary employees, age, debt ratio (interest-bearing borrowed
funds to interest-bearing liabilities), share of intangible assets, the ratio of cash to total
assets, and total fixed assets. Moreover, from these variables we compute a measure of
total factor productivity (TFP) for each firm.
2.3 A first glimpse at the data
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics at the sector level for the main variables
of interest in our analysis. In particular, it provides figures on two sets of variables:
responses to the survey (columns 1 and 2), and firm characteristics (columns 3-10). From
Panel A, it is worth emphasizing the wide heterogeneity across sectors in both the average
impact of the shock and the average firm characteristics. For instance, the average firm
in manufacturing experienced a fall of -12.66% in turnover against the -45.53% fall for
the average firm operating in the hospitality sector (-5.49% and -34.97% for employment,
respectively). Also, the average firm in manufacturing is 33% more productive than that
of hospitality (log TFP 1.28 versus 0.95), 8 years older, more rural (26% hospitality firms
are out of cities against 44% manufacturing firms), less indebted, holds less cash and are
much larger in terms of employees.
While heterogeneity across sectors is well-known, Panel B of Table 1 documents a
more interesting and potentially more important source of heterogeneity, that is, hetero-
geneity across firms within the same sector, which is the main focus of the paper. In
particular, it uncovers huge variation across firms within each sector as measured by the
interquartile range (IQR) given by the difference between the 75th and the 25th per-
centiles. For example, the TFP difference between the 75th percentile and the 25th in
the administrative services sector is even larger than the difference between the average
firm in manufacturing and hospitality from the table above: 0.54 against 0.33 (0.33=1.28-
0.95). This indicates that, while the average manufacturing firm is 33% more productive
that the average hospitality firm, the 75th percentile firm in administrative services is 54%
more productive than the 25th percentile firm in the same sector. In terms of age, the
manufacturing-hospitality average gap is 9 years, while the 75th-25th gap within admin.
services is 17 years. Regarding the cash holdings of firms, and hence the starting buffer
against the shock, there is also substantial heterogeneity, with the 75th percentile of firms
in the IT services holding a share that is 10 times larger than that of the 25th percentile
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(0.36 vs 0.03).5 We show in Table 9 on Appendix B that these summary statistics remain
qualitatively similar if we use weights to match the sector-size distribution. In light of
these figures, it seems crucial to better understand the heterogeneity of the COVID-19
shock and the responses across firms within each sector, something we investigate further
in the remaining of the paper.
3 The impact of the COVID-19 shock across firms
In order to assess the impact of COVID-19 on businesses, we rely on question 6
of the survey, which reads as follows: ‘How are your firms’ turnover and employment
in the 4Q20 compared to the same period last year? ’. Note that while turnover is more
informative about the size of the shock the firm received, the change in employment is
more informative about the reaction of the firm to the shock. The question specifically
asked about the total change in employment used, that is, including the extensive margin
adjustment (hiring or firing), and the intensive margin adjustment (workers on temporary
leave through furlough schemes - ERTEs). There were ten possible answers expressed in
intervals, depending on the percentage change decrease/increase. The distribution of
responses is shown in Figure 1. A first look at the distribution of the reported year-
on-year turnover changes (Panel A) reveals that the bulk of firms declared a negative
impact of COVID-19 (63%), while 24% report no change. In contrast, Panel B shows
that only 38% of respondents report having decreased their employment, and 54% report
no change.6 These patterns suggest that firms have been able to absorb part of the shock,
since their employment decreased less than their sales.
To analyze the type of firms most impacted by the COVID-19 shock, we investigate
which firm characteristics (productivity, age, share of temporary workers, intangible assets
share, indebtedness, cash ratio and size) correlate with the fall in activity at the firm
level. In particular, our baseline specification consists of a regression of either turnover or
employment growth of firm i (yi) on a vector of firm characteristics (Xi) as well as different
configurations of sector s (NACE rev 2-digit) and region j (Autonomous Communities)
fixed effects (γs,j):
5Note that the number of observations differs depending on which explanatory variable we look at. We
show in Table 8 on Appendix B that the results are qualitatively similar if we keep only the observations
for which we have all the regresors of interest (2,715 observations).
6This ‘inaction range’ masks a vast heterogeneity between sectors: while only 16.5% of firms in
hospitality services claim a no change in their employment with respect to the previous year, 82% of
the firms in the real state sector have been able to sustain their employment. Also, around 10% of the
respondents of the survey have 0 employees and most of them claim not having changed their employment.
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Table 1: Summary statistics by sector
PANEL A
Averages ∆ ∆ log Age Rural Temp. Intangible Debt Size Cash
Turnover Emp TFP Workers capital Ratio (Emp) ratio
Manufacturing -12.66 -5.49 1.28 29.03 0.44 0.12 0.09 0.31 142.34 0.12
Construction -12.23 -5.20 1.18 21.86 0.27 0.30 0.16 0.28 39.58 0.15
Trade -15.55 -7.34 0.84 25.67 0.26 0.13 0.13 0.30 63.37 0.15
Transport -16.34 -8.34 1.99 24.15 0.29 0.20 0.11 0.35 119.90 0.14
Hospitality -45.53 -34.97 0.95 20.76 0.26 0.29 0.10 0.36 38.02 0.17
IT services -11.33 -3.29 1.51 18.57 0.08 0.16 0.42 0.22 78.38 0.22
Real estate -10.27 -3.23 1.11 23.37 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.26 6.03 0.12
Prof. services -10.03 -5.01 1.70 19.34 0.13 0.12 0.25 0.24 45.68 0.24
Ad in. services -16.84 -11.92 1.77 17.98 0.16 0.22 0.26 0.31 254.79 0.23
Other services -32.23 -19.42 1.30 19.36 0.21 0.24 0.19 0.28 50.50 0.24
Total -16.10 -8.58 1.25 23.71 0.27 0.17 0.15 0.29 85.32 0.16
Obs 3,523 3,457 3,161 3,584 3,584 3,160 3,584 3,584 3,584 3,582
PANEL B
IQRs ∆ ∆ log Age Rural Temp. Intangible Debt Size Cash
Turnover E p TFP Workers apital Ratio (Emp) ratio
Manufacturing 22.50 7.50 0.20 17.00 1.00 0.17 0.04 0.45 65.62 0.16
Construction 22.50 2.50 0.36 16.00 1.00 0.50 0.03 0.48 31.06 0.21
Trade 22.50 7.50 0.17 18.00 1.00 0.18 0.06 0.53 36.00 0.19
Transport 22.50 7.50 0.39 16.00 1.00 0.26 0.02 0.56 43.00 0.16
Hospitality 20.00 52.50 0.23 17.00 1.00 0.30 0.01 0.61 31.80 0.20
IT services 22.50 2.50 0.52 14.00 0.00 0.21 0.96 0.40 63.00 0.33
Real estate 12.50 0.00 0.71 14.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 2.05 0.14
Prof. services 22.50 2.50 0.36 14.00 0.00 0.15 0.39 0.41 29.88 0.35
Admin. services 40.00 12.50 0.54 17.00 0.00 0.32 0.50 0.53 47.76 0.31
Other services 52.50 40.00 0.50 16.00 0.00 0.30 0.14 0.53 45.00 0.32
Total 22.50 7.50 0.64 17.00 1.00 0.24 0.07 0.51 42.25 0.21
Obs 3,523 3,457 3,161 3,584 3,584 3,160 3,584 3,584 3,584 3,582
Source: EBAE survey and Central de Balances Integrada.
Notes: Panel A shows the averages and Panel B the interquantile ranges (measured as p75-p25 within the industry). The
first column of both tables corresponds to yearly change in turnover, and the second column to the yearly change in
employment. Column 3, 4 and 5 correspond to log TFP, age of the firm, and the dummy variable indicating the
headquarters are in rural areas. Column 6 shows the share of temporary workers. Column 7, 8 and 10 show the share of
intangible capital (intangible capital over total capital), the debt ratio (total debt over total assets), and the cash ratio
(cash over total assets) respectively. Column 9 shows size, measured by the number of employees.
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(0.36 vs 0.03).5 We show in Table 9 on Appendix B that these summary statistics remain
qualitatively similar if we use weights to match the sector-size distribution. In light of
these figures, it seems crucial to better understand the heterogeneity of the COVID-19
shock and the responses across firms within each sector, something we investigate further
in the remaining of the paper.
3 The impact of the COVID-19 shock across firms
In order to assess the impact of COVID-19 on businesses, we rely on question 6
of the survey, which reads as follows: ‘How are your firms’ turnover and employment
in the 4Q20 compared to the same period last year? ’. Note that while turnover is more
informative about the size of the shock the firm received, the change in employment is
more informative about the reaction of the firm to the shock. The question specifically
asked about the total change in employment used, that is, including the extensive margin
adjustment (hiring or firing), and the intensive margin adjustment (workers on temporary
leave through furlough schemes - ERTEs). There were ten possible answers expressed in
intervals, depending on the percentage change decrease/increase. The distribution of
responses is shown in Figure 1. A first look at the distribution of the reported year-
on-year turnover changes (Panel A) reveals that the bulk of firms declared a negative
impact of COVID-19 (63%), while 24% report no change. In contrast, Panel B shows
that only 38% of respondents report having decreased their employment, and 54% report
no change.6 These patterns suggest that firms have been able to absorb part of the shock,
since their employment decreased less than their sales.
To analyze the type of firms most impacted by the COVID-19 shock, we investigate
which firm characteristics (productivity, age, share of temporary workers, intangible assets
share, indebtedness, cash ratio and size) correlate with the fall in activity at the firm
level. In particular, our baseline specification consists of a regression of either turnover or
employment growth of firm i (yi) on a vector of firm characteristics (Xi) as well as different
configurations of sector s (NACE rev 2-digit) and region j (Autonomous Communities)
fixed effects (γs,j):
5Note that the number of observations differs depending on which explanatory variable we look at. We
show in Table 8 on Appendix B that the results are qualitatively similar if we keep only the observations
for which we have all the regresors of interest (2,715 observations).
6This ‘inaction range’ masks a vast heterogeneity between sectors: while only 16.5% of firms in
hospitality services claim a no change in their employment with respect to the previous year, 82% of
the firms in the real state sector have been able to sustain their employment. Also, around 10% of the
respondents of the survey have 0 employees and most of them claim not having changed their employment.
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asked about the total change in empl yment used, that is, including the extensive argin
adjustment (hiring or firing), and the intensive argin adjustment (workers on tempor r
leave thr gh furlough schemes - ERTEs). There were ten possible answers expressed
intervals, depending on the percentage change decre se/incr ase. Th distributi n of
r sponses is shown in Figure 1. A first look at the distribution of the eported year-
on-year turnover changes (Panel A) reveals that the bulk of firms declared a negative
im act of COVID-19 (63%), while 24% report no change. In contrast, Panel B shows
that only 38% of respondents report having decreased their employment, nd 54% report
no change.6 These patterns suggest that firms have been able to abso b part of the shock,
since their employment creased less than thei sales.
To analyz the type of firms most impacted by the COVID-19 shock, we inv stigate
which firm characteristics (productivity, age, sha e of temporary workers, intangible assets
share, indebtedness, cash ratio and ize) corr late with the fall in activity at the firm
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5Note that the number of observations differs depending on which explanatory variable we look at. We
show in Table 8 on Appendix B that the results are qualitatively similar if we keep only the observations
for which we have all the regresors of interest (2,715 observations).
6This ‘inac ion rang ’ masks a vast het rogeneity between sectors: while only 16.5% f firms in
hospitality services claim a no c nge in their employment with respect to th previous year, 82% of
the firms in t e re l s ate sector have been able to sustain their employment. Also, around 10% of the
respondents of the survey have 0 employees and most of them claim not having changed their employ ent.
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Figure 1: Distribution of responses
Panel A: C e i s les
Panel B: Ch nge in employment
Source: EBAE surv y
Notes: Panel A shows the reported year-on-year change in turnover. Panel B shows the reported year-on-year change in
employment, taking into account hires/layoffs and workers in a furlough scheme (ERTE)
yi = α + β
′Xi + γs,j + εi (1)
Table 2 shows the estimation results. The first four columns use sales growth as
dependent variable, whereas the last four columns use employment growth. The four
columns for each dependent variable differ in the FE configuration considered. Our pre-
ferred specifications is the one that includes a full set of sector-region dummies, and thus
the identification relies on comparing different firms within the same sector and region
(columns 4 and 8).
We start by analyzing the change in turnover reported by firms. Column (4) of Table
2 suggests that firms that are less productive, smaller and urban are the ones that suffered
most from the shock, reporting the largest decrease in sales. Smaller firms may have
suffered more due to the spatial concentration of their activity and the high dependence
on their input-output network. Urban firms received a larger shock because they have
been more exposed to the strict lockdowns implemented, which were significantly more
stringent in cities than in rural areas, at least at the beginning of the pandemic.
Next, we turn to analyze the changes in employment as reported by firms. Column
(8) of Table 2 shows that smaller firms with lower TFP report a significantly larger
decrease in employment, which aligns with the findings of these firms suffering more from
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(0.36 vs 0.03).5 We show in Table 9 on Appendix B that these summary statistics remain
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in the remaining of the paper.
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in the 4Q20 compared to the same period last year? ’. Note that while turnover is more
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more informative about the reaction of the firm to the shock. The question specifically
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adjustment (hiring or firing), and the intensive margin adjustment (workers on temporary
leave through furlough schemes - ERTEs). There were ten possible answers expressed in
intervals, depending on the percentage change decrease/increase. The distribution of
responses is shown in Figure 1. A first look at the distribution of the reported year-
on-year turnover changes (Panel A) reveals that the bulk of firms declared a negative
impact of COVID-19 (63%), while 24% report no change. In contrast, Panel B shows
that only 38% of respondents report having decreased their employment, and 54% report
no change.6 These patterns suggest that firms have been able to absorb part of the shock,
since their employment decreased less than their sales.
To analyze the type of firms most impacted by the COVID-19 shock, we investigate
which firm characteristics (productivity, age, share of temporary workers, intangible assets
share, indebtedness, cash ratio and size) correlate with the fall in activity at the firm
level. In particular, our baseline specification consists of a regression of either turnover or
employment growth of firm i (yi) on a vector of firm characteristics (Xi) as well as different
configurations of sector s (NACE rev 2-digit) and region j (Autonomous Communities)
fixed effects (γs,j):
5Note that the number of observations differs depending on which explanatory variable we look at. We
show in Table 8 on Appendix B that the results are qualitatively similar if we keep only the observations
for which we have all the regresors of interest (2,715 observations).
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Table 2: Impact of the COVID-19 shock on firms.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover Emp. Emp. Emp. Emp.
TFP 4.74*** 2.90** 2.79** 2.90** 3.65*** 2.63*** 2.47** 2.04**
(1.20) (1.18) (1.16) (1.23) (1.08) (1.01) (1.00) (1.01)
Age 0.08** 0.06** 0.04 0.05* 0.08** 0.04* 0.03 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Rural 3.29*** 2.86*** 2.66*** 2.71*** 2.25** 1.62* 1.22 1.52
(1.08) (0.87) (0.90) (0.97) (1.02) (0.85) (0.89) (0.93)
Temporary -8.93*** -1.31 -1.17 -1.00 -13.54*** -7.53*** -7.34*** -7.87***
workers (%) (2.74) (1.96) (2.00) (2.16) (2.34) (1.87) (1.85) (1.88)
Intangible 0.09 -1.64 -1.77 -1.34 2.89* 2.11 2.07 1.82
Assets (%) (1.95) (1.74) (1.72) (1.83) (1.57) (1.48) (1.50) (1.60)
Debt ratio -2.00 0.12 -0.22 -0.26 -1.67 0.33 -0.03 0.45
(1.72) (1.45) (1.45) (1.53) (1.54) (1.28) (1.26) (1.32)
Cash ratio -3.48 -1.50 -1.64 -1.22 0.37 2.80 2.75 3.30*
(2.92) (2.41) (2.39) (2.55) (2.08) (1.79) (1.77) (1.84)
10-50 emp. 1.09 1.19 1.28 1.16 0.53 0.41 0.59 0.06
(1.08) (0.98) (0.98) (1.04) (0.96) (0.90) (0.90) (0.94)
50-250 emp. 6.42*** 5.19*** 5.34*** 4.96*** 3.54*** 2.48** 2.75*** 2.73**
(1.49) (1.30) (1.28) (1.38) (1.21) (1.06) (1.06) (1.10)
+250 emp. 6.77*** 6.75*** 7.75*** 8.53*** 4.49** 4.25*** 5.08*** 5.21***
(2.33) (1.95) (2.00) (2.28) (1.91) (1.48) (1.48) (1.52)
Observations 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715
R2 0.04 0.27 0.29 0.37 0.05 0.27 0.29 0.39
Sector FE NO YES YES NO NO YES YES NO
Region FE NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO
Sect-region FE NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
Source: EBAE and Central de Balances. Notes: Outcomes of regression (1) using as dependent variable
the reported year-on-year change in turnover (columns 1-4) and the reported year-on-year change in
employment (columns 5-8) from question 6. Each column differs in the set of fixed effects included.
Region-sector clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
this shock, as showed in column 4. However, two other interesting findings emerge. First,
firms with a larger share of temporary workers decrease their employment levels more,
pointing at a larger adjustment of employment of these firms due to lower staff adjustment
costs.7 Second, firms with a small cash buffer reduced more their employment. After the
lockdowns and the decrease in sales, the first lifeline firms have to restore to is their
own cash savings. Firms with more cash have been able to cushion the shock better and
needed to restore less to adjusting staff to avoid losses. Interestingly enough, pre-crisis
indebtedness levels and the share of intangible assets do not play a significant role in
explaining the heterogeneity in the impact of the COVID-19 shock across firms on sales,
nor firms’ responses to the shock via changes in employment.
7The Spanish labor market is characterized by its duality, which implies the coexistence of temporary
contracts with low firing costs and permanent contracts with high firing costs.
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Since the data shows that firms have been able to absorb part of the shock (em-
ployment declined far less than turnover), we investigate which firms have been more or
less able to do so. With this purpose, first we regress the employment change on turnover
change, and second we study which firm characteristics predict the inverse of the resid-
ual from that regression, which could be interpreted as a measure of the ability of firms
to cushion the turnover shock. The results are in Table 12 in Appendix B, and they
show that the only firm characteristic that seems to explain the absorption capacity is
productivity. Higher TFP firms present lower pass-through of the turnover shock to em-
ployment. Lastly, we explore the existence of non-linearities in the turnover-employment
relationship by including the turnover change and its square to the baseline specification.
Interestingly enough, although small, the square term is strongly significant and indicates
that the larger the drop in turnover, the higher the impact on employment (see Table 13
in Appendix B).
Finally, we also explore if the severity of the impact of the COVID-19 shock on
firms’ activity is correlated with the pre-pandemic trends and capital intensity (see Table
11 in Appendix B). The past evolution of each firm is proxied by the average annual
growth rate of both sales and employment over the period 2017-2019, but they are not
statistically significant, so we conclude that the role of pre-COVID-19 firm performance
is muted. The capital intensity is measured by the capital-to-labor ratio. Firms that
are more capital intensive tend to destroy less employment, as they may have little to
gain by decreasing their workforce. In a Cobb-Douglas production function with Hicks
neutral technical change, labor productivity can be decomposed in two components: TFP
plus capital-to-labor ratio, so that one can interpret this result as evidence that both
components of labor productivity play a role in cushioning the impact of the COVID-19
shock.
Summing up, these findings indicate that smaller, less productive and younger firms
were hit relatively harder by the COVID-19 shock within each sector and region. We
interpret this result as suggestive evidence in favor of the cleansing effects of the COVID-
19 shock, typically associated to crisis episodes not only across sectors but also within
sectors.
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firms with a larger share of temporary workers decrease their employment levels more,
pointing at a larger adjustment of employment of these firms due to lower staff adjustment
costs.7 Second, firms with a small cash buffer reduced more their employment. After the
lockdowns and the decrease in sales, the first lifeline firms have to restore to is their
own cash savings. Firms with more cash have been able to cushion the shock better and
needed to restore less to adjusting staff to avoid losses. Interestingly enough, pre-crisis
indebtedness levels and the share of intangible assets do not play a significant role in
explaining the heterogeneity in the i pact of the COVID-19 shock across firms on sales,
nor firms’ responses to the shock via changes in e loy e t.
7The Spanish labor market is characterized by its duality, which implies the coexistence of temporary
contracts with low firing costs nd permanent contracts with high firing costs.
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Since the data shows that firms have been able to absorb part of the shock (em-
ployment declined far less than turnover), we investigate which firms have been more or
less able to do so. With this purpose, first we regress the employment change on turnover
change, and second we study which firm characteristics predict the inverse of the resid-
ual from that regression, which could be interpreted as a measure of the ability of firms
to cushion the turnover shock. The results are in Table 12 in Appendix B, and they
show that the only firm characteristic that seems to explain the absorption capacity is
productivity. Higher TFP firms present lower pass-through of the turnover shock to em-
ployment. Lastly, we explore the existence of non-linearities in the turnover-employment
relationship by including the turnover change and its square to the baseline specification.
Interestingly enough, although small, the square term is strongly significant and indicates
that the larger the drop in turnover, the higher the impact on employment (see Table 13
in Appendix B).
Finally, we also explore if the severity of the impact of the COVID-19 shock on
firms’ activity is correlated with the pre-pandemic trends and capital intensity (see Table
11 in Appendix B). The past evolution of each firm is proxied by the average annual
growth rate of both sales and employment over the period 2017-2019, but they are not
statistically significant, so we conclude that the role of pre-COVID-19 firm performance
is muted. The capital intensity is measured by the capital-to-labor ratio. Firms that
are more capital intensive tend to destroy less employment, as they may have little to
gain by decreasing their workforce. In a Cobb-Douglas production function with Hicks
neutral technical change, labor productivity can be decomposed in two components: TFP
plus capital-to-labor ratio, so that one can interpret this result as evidence that both
components of labor productivity play a role in cushioning the impact of the COVID-19
shock.
Summing up, these findings indicate that smaller, less productive and younger firms
were hit relatively harder by the COVID-19 shock within each sector and region. We
interpret this result as suggestive evidence in favor of the cleansing effects of the COVID-
19 shock, typically associated to crisis episodes not only across sectors but also within
sectors.
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4 Firm-level responses and policy measures in the
wake of the COVID-19 shock
4.1 Firm responses to cushion the shock
As explained in the previous section, one obvious margin to adjust when facing the
COVID-19 shock is adjusting the employment margin. However, there are other margins
firms can adjust to avoid losses (e.g. use of work from home, decreasing investment,
restoring to e-commerce, etc...). This section focuses on which margins firms have used
to mitigate the COVID-19 shock. We rely on question 7, that reads ‘Please indicate the
extent to which you are currently using the following measures to cushion the impact of
COVID-19 on your business ’, followed by a list of measures, and to each there were four
possible answers: ‘not at all ’, ‘somewhat relevant ’, ‘relevant ’ and ‘very relevant ’. Next, we
construct for each measure an indicator, which takes the value of 1 if the firm responded
the measure is relevant or very relevant, and 0 otherwise.
Figure 2: Distribution of firms’ responses to COVID-19 shock
Panel A: Overall
Panel B: By change in sales
Source: EBAE survey.
Notes: Panel A: Fraction of respondents answering that the margin of adjustment was ‘relevant ’ or ‘very relevant ’, where
these margins are: reductions in planned investment ( Investment - blue), implementation of working from home schemes
(WfH - red), reinforcement of e-commerce (E-commerce - green), and firing of workers (Firing - yellow). Panel B:
Breakdown of responses shown in Panel A by the size of the shock, measured as the change in year-on-year turnover (∆Y ).
Figure 2 shows the percentage of respondents that indicated the measure is relevant
or very relevant for them, both for the overall sample (Panel A) and disaggregated by the
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change in turnover they reported in the previous section (Panel ). Overall, Panel A shows
the most used margin is a reduction in investment (38%), followed by the implementation
of working from home (WfH, 32%), reinforcing of e-commerce (22%) and firing employees
(18%). Note that firing in this question refers strictly to layoffs, while the employment
measure studied in detail in the previous sections refers to the reduction of employment
used, i.e. layoffs and workers included in the furlough schemes. There is heterogeneity
depending on the magnitude of the shock received as shown in Panel B: firms that received
a larger shock find decreasing investment, firing and the renegotiation of rental contracts
more relevant than firms that suffered a lower decrease in turnover. However, e-commerce
was implemented more or less symmetrically in all firms, and working from home was
implemented more in firms that suffered a lower decrease in turnover.
Next, we turn to the heterogeneity of these responses. In order to do so, we run the
same specification as in the previous section, equation (1), but use as dependent variables
the dummies we constructed for each of the responses showed above. We use our preferred
specification, i.e. including sector-region fixed effects. Results are shown in Table 3.
Looking at Column (1), within the same sector and region, larger firms used more in-
tensively working-from-home schemes (note that the omitted category is 0-10 employees).
Also, for a given size and within the same sector and region, younger firms in urban areas
resorted more intensively to WfH schemes. Finally, WfH was also used more intensively
by firms with less temporary workers and more intangible capital even after accounting
for other factors such as size, sector, geographical location and age.
Column (2) shows that less productive companies reported higher efforts in rein-
forcing e-commerce. These findings are in line with those of Alfonso et al. (2020). One
possible rationale for this finding is that less productive firms used less intensively the
e-commerce channel before the pandemic so that the COVID-19 shock induced a within-
sector catch-up process of less productive firms with respect to more productive firms that
were already using e-commerce even before the pandemic.
Reductions in planned investments, shown in Column (3), were more useful for firms
located in rural areas, with lower productivity, and medium-sized (50-250 employees).
Finally, Column (4) shows the use of firing as a margin to adjust, where we find the only
significant coefficient is the share of temporary workers of the firm. It is interesting to note
that very few firms fired workers to adjusts to the shock, and only the temporary share
is significant in this regression, which suggests that the adjustment of labor was mainly
made along the intensive margin with the use of furlough schemes (ERTEs), something
we explore in the next section.
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Table 3: Reaction to the COVID-19 shocks.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WfH e-COMM Invest. Firing
TFP -0.002 -0.059** -0.058* -0.019
(0.027) (0.026) (0.030) (0.023)
Age -0.002*** -0.002** -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Rural -0.060*** -0.025 0.058** 0.003
(0.019) (0.020) (0.024) (0.019)
Temporary workers -0.224*** -0.071* -0.050 0.173***
(0.047) (0.040) (0.049) (0.042)
Intangible share 0.172*** 0.062 0.052 -0.032
(0.046) (0.051) (0.053) (0.044)
Debt ratio -0.046 0.004 0.043 0.008
(0.035) (0.030) (0.035) (0.027)
Cash ratio -0.073 0.036 -0.047 0.003
(0.050) (0.053) (0.060) (0.049)
Employees = 2, 10-50 emp. 0.044* 0.003 -0.016 0.019
(0.025) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020)
Employees = 3, 50-250 emp. 0.190*** 0.042 -0.057** 0.009
(0.032) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
Employees = 4, +250 emp. 0.304*** -0.010 0.013 -0.041
(0.044) (0.045) (0.052) (0.038)
Observations 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715
R2 0.327 0.191 0.167 0.200
SectXreg FE YES YES YES YES
Source: EBAE survey and Central de Balances.
Notes: Outcomes of regression (1) using as dependent variable a dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm perceives as
very relevant or relevant working from home schemes (column 1), reinforcing of e-commerce (column 2), the reduction in
planned investment (column 3) and the firing of workers (column 4). The regression includes a full set of sector-region
fixed effects. Region-sector clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4.2 Usefulness of policy support measures across firms
Given the magnitude of the COVID-19 shock, the Spanish government have put in
place several policy measures with the aim of helping firms in distress due to the pandemic.
First, it has implemented a scheme of state-guaranteed credit through the Instituto de
Crédito Oficial (ICO), a Spanish state-owned bank. Second, it has implemented a fur-
lough scheme through which, for eligible firms that apply for it, social security provides
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furloughed workers with 70 percent of their base salary for the first six months, before
dropping to 50 percent for the following months, without the need of firing them (Ex-
pediente de Regulación Temporal de Empleo, or ERTE).8 Other policy measures include
tax deferral schemes, and regulation making it easier for firms to renegotiate rentals. In
this section, we want to explore which firms used these policy tools more intensively, and
hence gauge its effectiveness.
For this purpose, we also use question 7 as in the previous section, where these policy
measures were listed along with the other firm level measures. We create dummies that
take the value of one if the policy measure was relevant or very relevant for the firm, and
zero otherwise. Figure 3 shows the distribution of responses. Panel A shows ICO loans
are the policy measure deemed more useful, with nearly 43% of respondents stating it was
very helpful to deal with the COVID-19 shock, followed by ERTEs (29%), tax deferrals
(24%) and renegotiation of rental payments (21%). Firms with a larger decline in sales
use all these tools more intensively (Panel B), especially ERTEs.
Figure 3: Distribution of usefulness of policy support measures
Panel A: Overall
Panel B: By change in turnover
Source: EBAE survey.
Notes: Panel A: Fraction of respondents answering that the policy tool was relevant or very relevant, where policy tools
are: furlough schemes ( ERTEs - blue), state-guaranteed credit (ICOs - red), tax deferrals (Tax def. - green), and
renegotiation of rental contracts (Rentals - yellow). Panel B: Breakdown of responses shown in Panel A by the size of the
shock, measured as the change in year-on-year turnover (∆Y ).
Looking now at the heterogeneity, we perform again regression (1), using as depen-
8Those companies that take part in the scheme are banned from making layoffs in the six months
after it ends.
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For this purpose, we also use question 7 as in the previous section, where these policy
measures were listed along with the other firm level measures. We create dummies that
take the value of one if the policy measure was relevant or very relevant for the firm, and
zero otherwise. Figure 3 shows the distribution of responses. Panel A shows ICO loans
are the policy measure deemed more useful, with nearly 43% of respondents stating it was
very helpful to deal with the COVID-19 shock, followed by ERTEs (29%), tax deferrals
(24%) and renegotiation of rental payments (21%). Firms with a larger decline in sales
use all these tools more intensively (Panel B), especially ERTEs.
Figure 3: Distribution of usefulness of policy support measures
Panel A: Overall
Panel B: By change in turnover
Source: EBAE survey.
Notes: Panel A: Fraction of respondents answering that the policy tool was relevant or very relevant, where policy tools
are: furlough schemes ( ERTEs - blue), state-guaranteed credit (ICOs - red), tax deferrals (Tax def. - green), and
renegotiation of rental contracts (Rentals - yellow). Panel B: Breakdown of responses shown in Panel A by the size of the
shock, measured as the change in year-on-year turnover (∆Y ).
Looking now at the heterogeneity, we perform again regression (1), using as depen-
8Those companies that take part in the scheme are banned from making layoffs in the six months
after it ends.
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dent variables the dummies that take the value 1 if the firm finds the policy tool relevant
or very relevant in the alleviation of the COVID-19 shock. Table 4 shows the result of
our preferred specification, that is, with a full set of sector-region fixed effects.
Turning to ERTEs in column (1), they are deemed as especially useful for medium-
sized firms (10-250 employees) but less so for very small (0-10 employees) and very large
(+250 employees) firms. Also, less productive and urban firms resorted relatively more
to ERTEs than more productive firms in rural areas. It is notable that we do not find
that firms with a higher share of temporary workers make more use of ERTEs, but we
did find in section 4.1 that firms with a higher temporary share found layoffs more useful
as a margin to adjust to the shock. Hence, while ERTEs have been a useful tool to
cushion the shock for firms, they have not been able to protect employment of temporary
workers. This finding is in line with the results of similar policies implemented in the
Great Recession (Hijzen & Venn (2011)).
ICO loans (loans with public guarantees), shown in column (2), were perceived as
less useful for larger companies within each sector-region pair. Firms with larger cash
buffers find this tool less useful: since they have more internal resources to face the shock,
they rely less on external financing. Interestingly enough, for a given region, sector and
firm size, these public-guaranteed loans were more useful for less productive, younger, and
more indebted companies. There may be demand and supply reasons to account for this
finding. On the demand side, highly indebted firms may have the incentive of taking on
more loans due to the higher risk of liquidity shortfalls if the pandemic lasts longer than
expected. On the supply side, banks may be more willing to provide loans to clients with
high outstanding exposure, thus providing a liquidity cushion against potential short-term
defaults on banks’ loans.9 This is in line with the findings of Brülhart et al. (2020) for
Swiss firms.
Similar patterns are observed in column (3) for tax deferrals, with the exception that
there is no distinction between more/less productive firms in its use. Finally, renegotiation
of rental payments was more useful for less productive, small and urban firms, and those
with a higher share of temporary workers (column (4)).
Overall, we find that the policies implemented in order to mitigate the impact of the
shock have been more widely used by smaller and less productive firms, with a larger share
of temporary workers, high debts levels and low cash buffers, although we find substantial
heterogeneity depending on the measure.
9Disentangling each of these mechanisms is outside the scope of this paper.
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dent variables the dummies that take the value 1 if the firm finds the policy tool relevant
or very relevant in the alleviation of the COVID-19 shock. Table 4 shows the result of
our preferred specification, that is, with a full set of sector-region fixed effects.
Turning to ERTEs in column (1), they are deemed as especially useful for medium-
sized firms (10-250 employees) but less so for very small (0-10 employees) and very large
(+250 employees) firms. Also, less productive and urban firms resorted relatively more
to ERTEs than more productive firms in rural areas. It is notable that we do not find
that firms with a higher share of temporary workers make more use of ERTEs, but we
did find in section 4.1 that firms with a higher temporary share found layoffs more useful
as a margin to adjust to the shock. Hence, while ERTEs have been a useful tool to
cushion the shock for firms, they have not been able to protect employment of temporary
workers. This finding is in line with the results of similar policies implemented in the
Great Recession (Hijzen & Venn (2011)).
ICO loans (loans with public guarantees), shown in column (2), were perceived as
less useful for larger companies within each sector-region pair. Firms with larger cash
buffers find this tool less useful: since they have more internal resources to face the shock,
they rely less on external financing. Interestingly enough, for a given region, sector and
firm size, these public-guaranteed loans were more useful for less productive, younger, and
more indebted companies. There may be demand and supply reasons to account for this
finding. On the demand side, highly indebted firms may have the incentive of taking on
more loans due to the higher risk of liquidity shortfalls if the pandemic lasts longer than
expected. On the supply side, banks may be more willing to provide loans to clients with
high outstanding exposure, thus providing a liquidity cushion against potential short-term
defaults on banks’ loans.9 This is in line with the findings of Brülhart et al. (2020) for
Swiss firms.
Similar patterns are observed in column (3) for tax deferrals, with the exception that
there is no distinction between more/less productive firms in its use. Finally, renegotiation
of rental payments was more useful for less productive, small and urban firms, and those
with a higher share of temporary workers (column (4)).
Overall, we find that the policies implemented in order to mitigate the impact of the
shock have been more widely used by smaller and less productive firms, with a larger share
of temporary workers, high debts levels and low cash buffers, although we find substantial
heterogeneity depending on the measure.
9Disentangling each of these mechanisms is outside the scope of this paper.
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Table 4: Policy measures to support firms.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ERTEs ICOs Tax def. Rentals.
TFP -0.050* -0.081** -0.033 -0.077***
(0.027) (0.035) (0.026) (0.028)
Age -0.001 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Rural -0.052** -0.034 -0.028 -0.033*
(0.024) (0.025) (0.019) (0.019)
Temporary workers 0.044 0.165*** 0.088** 0.096**
(0.049) (0.054) (0.044) (0.044)
Intangible share -0.016 0.033 0.008 0.027
(0.051) (0.050) (0.042) (0.036)
Debt ratio 0.037 0.317*** 0.062* 0.004
(0.035) (0.040) (0.033) (0.036)
Cash ratio -0.060 -0.389*** -0.254*** 0.070
(0.051) (0.062) (0.055) (0.049)
10-50 emp. 0.072*** 0.051* -0.054** -0.056**
(0.022) (0.028) (0.026) (0.023)
50-250 emp. 0.063** -0.028 -0.168*** -0.068***
(0.031) (0.034) (0.025) (0.026)
+250 emp. 0.031 -0.303*** -0.218*** -0.130***
(0.047) (0.046) (0.042) (0.045)
Observations 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715
R2 0.266 0.261 0.235 0.212
SectXreg FE YES YES YES YES
Source: EBAE survey and Central de Balances.
Notes: Outcomes of regression (1) using as dependent variable a dummy that takes the value 1 if the
firm perceives as very relevant or relevant furlough schemes (ERTEs - column 1), state-guaranteed loans
(ICOs - column 2), tax deferrals (Tax def. - column 3), and renegotiation of rental contracts (Rentals -
column 4). The regression includes a full set of sector-region fixed effects. Region-sector clustered
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5 Factors conditioning firms’ activity
We have documented the heterogeneity of the COVID-19 shock even within sector
and region. In this section, we aim to understand which are the factors of the shock that
are affecting firms the most. To this purpose, we use question 5, which reads ‘How have
the following factors affected your firm’s activity? ’. There was a list of factors, and to
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each of them, five possible answers: ‘very negative’, ‘negative’, ‘neutral ’, ‘positive’ and
‘very positive’. We also convert these variables into dummies, taking the value of one if
the answer was very negative or negative, and zero otherwise. Table 4 shows the summary
statistics of these responses. Panel A shows that uncertainty is the factor conditioning
firms’ activity the most, with nearly 80% of firms stating pandemic uncertainty was
affecting their activity negatively, followed by policy uncertainty (77%). The next factor
in importance is the evolution of demand (48%), unpaid receivables (34%) and competition
pressures (33%) , followed by problems accessing financing (17%), disruptions in supply
(13%) and availability of workers (10%). Looking at which factors affect more firms
depending on the fall in their turnover (Panel B of Figure 4), political and pandemic
uncertainty still are the most important negative factor. For firms suffering the largest
drop in turnover, demand is a very relevant factor, while it is less so for firms receiving a
smaller shock.
Figure 4: Distribution of main factors conditioning firms’ activity due to COVID-19
shock
Panel A: Overall
Panel B: By change in turnover
Source: EBAE survey.
Notes: Panel A: Fraction of respondents answering that the factor affected firms’ activity negatively or very negatively,
where these factors are: pandemic uncertainty (blue), policy uncertainty (red), demand disruptions (green), unpaid
receivables ( yellow), competition pressures (grey), problems accessing financing (bright red), supply disruptions (purple)
and availability of workers (beige). Panel B: Shows the breakdown of responses shown in Panel A by the size of the shock,
measured as the change in year-on-year turnover (∆Y ).
Given the utmost importance of uncertainty of the COVID-19 shock, we will devote
the next section entirely to explore this margin. Appendix C shows the result of regression
(1), where the dependent variable is the dummy response for each of the factors. Rural
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dent variables the dummies that take the value 1 if the firm finds the policy tool relevant
or very relevant in the alleviation of the COVID-19 shock. Table 4 shows the result of
our preferred specification, that is, with a full set of sector-region fixed effects.
Turning to ERTEs in column (1), they are deemed as especially useful for medium-
sized firms (10-250 employees) but less so for very small (0-10 employees) and very large
(+250 employees) firms. Also, less productive and urban firms resorted relatively more
to ERTEs than more productive firms in rural areas. It is notable that we do not find
that firms with a higher share of temporary workers make more use of ERTEs, but we
did find in section 4.1 that firms with a higher temporary share found layoffs more useful
as a margin to adjust to the shock. Hence, while ERTEs have been a useful tool to
cushion the shock for firms, they have not been able to protect employment of temporary
workers. This finding is in line with the results of similar policies implemented in the
Great Recession (Hijzen & Venn (2011)).
ICO loans (lo ns with public guarantees), shown in column (2), were perceived as
less useful for larger companies within each sector-region pair. Firms with larger cash
buffers find this tool less useful: since they have more internal resources to face the shock,
they rely less on external financing. Interestingly enough, for a given region, sector and
firm size, these public-guaranteed loans were more useful for less productive, younger, and
more indebted companies. There may be demand and supply reasons to account for this
finding. On the demand side, highly indebted firms may have the incentive of taking on
more loans due to the higher risk of liquidity shortfalls if the pandemic lasts longer than
expected. On the supply side, banks may be more willing to provide loans to clients with
high outstanding exposure, thus providing a liquidity cushion against potential short-term
defaults on banks’ loans.9 This is in line with the findings of Brülhart et al. (2020) for
Swiss firms.
Similar patterns are observed in column (3) for tax deferrals, with the exception that
there is no distinction between more/less productive firms in its use. Finally, renegotiation
of rental payments was more useful for less productive, small and urban firms, and those
with a higher share of temporary workers (column (4)).
Overall, we find that the policies implemented in order to mitigate the impact of the
shock have been more widely us d by smaller and less productive firms, with a l rg r sh re
of temporary workers, high debts levels and low cash buffers, although we find substantial
heterogeneity depending on the measure.
9Disentangling each of these mechanisms is outside the scope of this paper.
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each of th m, five possib answers: ‘very negative’, ‘negative’, ‘neutral ’, ‘positive’ and
‘very positive’. We also conver these variable into dummi s, taking the value of one if
the answer was very negative or negative, and z ro oth rwi e. Table 4 shows the summary
tatistics of these r sponses. Panel A shows th t uncertainty is the factor conditioning
firms’ activit the mo t, with nearly 80% of firms st ting pandemic uncertainty was
affecting their activity negatively, followed by policy uncertainty (77%). The next factor
in importance is the evolution of demand (48%), unpaid receivables (34%) and competition
pressures (33%) , followed by problems accessing financing (17%), disruptions in s pply
(13%) nd avail bility of workers (10%). Looking at whic factors affect more firms
depending on the fall in their turnover (Panel B of Figur 4), political and pandemic
uncertainty still are the most important negative factor. For firm suffering the largest
drop in turnover, dema d is a very relevant factor, while it is less so for firms receiving a
smaller shock.
Figure 4: Distribution of main factors conditioning firms’ activity due to COVID-19
shock
Panel A: Overall
Panel B: By change in turnover
Source: EBAE survey.
No es: Panel A: Fraction of respondents nswering that the factor affected firms’ activity negatively or very negatively,
where these factors are: pandemic uncertainty (blue), policy uncertainty (red), demand disruptions (green), unpaid
receivables ( yellow), competition pressures (grey), problems accessing financing (bright red), supply disruptions (purple)
and availability of workers (beige). Panel B: Shows the breakdown of responses shown in Panel A by the size of the shock,
measured as the change in year-on-year turnover (∆Y ).
Given the utmost importance of uncertainty of the COVID-19 shock, we will devote
the next section entirely to explore this margin. Appendix C shows the result of regression
(1), where the dependent variable is the dummy response for each of the factors. Rural
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and large businesses were less affected by demand factors. Larger firms are less affected
by problems related to accessing financing, while firms that were previously indebted find
that this factor affected them more negatively. This is in line with the findings in the
previous section that more indebted companies are more likely to ask for loans with public
guarantees (ICOs). Supply disruptions affect less negatively large and more productive
firms, while firms with larger cash holdings find this factor affects them more negatively.
Increased competition affects less negatively large, indebted and productive firms.
5.1 The role of uncertainty
The COVID-19 shock brought about an unprecedented increase in uncertainty. The
sources of this uncertainty are wide ranging. First, on the epidemiological side, uncertain-
ties include the infectiousness of the virus, the development and effectiveness of vaccines,
th magnitude of the succe ive waves f COVID-19, the appearance of new viru strains
and the duration and effectiveness of social distancing. Second, on the economic side, the
unprecedented nature of the shock creates an uncertain outlook related to the short-term
impact of containment measures on business activity, the policy measures and their im-
pact on the econo y, the speed of the recovery and the changes in households’ spending
patterns, among others. Because of this, as shown in the previous section, firms perceive
uncertainty as the main factor affecting negatively their activity.
We begin the analysis of heterogeneity running the same regression as before, equa-
tion 1, but adding now a set of week dummies (in order to control for the response date
as new information about the evolution of pandemic may affect the perception of uncer-
tainty) and the year-on-year change in turnover (in order to account for the magnitude
of the firm-specific shock that may also affect the perception of uncertainty). Results are
shown in Table 5. We use as dependent variable the responses dealing with uncertainty
from question 5 we used in the previous section, i.e. using dummies that take the value
1 if the firm perceives that economic and policy uncertainty affected negatively their ac-
tivity (columns (1) and (2) respectively of Table 5). We complement it with the answers
to question 8, which reads ‘When will your firm’s activity return to pre-crisis levels? ’.
We construct a dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm replied ‘too uncertain’ to this
question, and zero otherwise. The regression with this variable as dependent variable is
shown in column (3) of Table 5.
Turning to uncertainty associated to the pandemic and to policy measures (columns
(1) and (2), respectively), it is surprising that there are no significant differences on
20
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Table 5: Reaction to the COVID-19 shock.
(1) (2) (3)
Pandemic uncertainty Policy uncertainty Recovery uncertainty
∆ Turnover -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.008***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
TFP -0.007 -0.023 -0.039
(0.028) (0.032) (0.031)
Age 0.000 -0.001* 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Rural -0.012 -0.024 0.022
(0.023) (0.025) (0.026)
Temporary workers 0.004 0.027 0.069
(0.045) (0.046) (0.061)
Intangible share 0.056 -0.052 -0.041
(0.039) (0.048) (0.056)
Debt ratio -0.021 -0.039 -0.049
(0.035) (0.037) (0.047)
Cash ratio -0.039 -0.112* 0.008
(0.066) (0.066) (0.075)
10-50 emp. 0.014 0.008 -0.022
(0.023) (0.027) (0.027)
50-250 emp. 0.031 -0.008 -0.049
(0.029) (0.038) (0.038)
+250 emp. -0.037 -0.160** -0.053
(0.060) (0.071) (0.064)
Observations 2,032 2,032 2,032
R2 0.206 0.198 0.268
SectXreg FE YES YES YES
Week FE YES YES YES
Source: EBAE survey and Central de Balances.
Notes: Outcomes of regression (1) using as dependent variable a dummy that takes the value 1 if the
firm perceives that pandemic and political uncertainty is impacting its activity negatively or very
negatively (columns 1 and 2 respectively), or if the firms states that there is too much uncertainty to
ascertain the time of recovery (column 3). Regressors include size of the shock, proxied by the
year-on-year change in turnover, and firm observable characteristics (TFP, age, share of temporary
workers, share of intangible assets, debt ratio, cash ratio and size bins).The regression includes week
fixed effects, a full set of sector-region fixed effects. Region-sector clustered standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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and large businesses were less affected by demand factors. Larger firms are less affected
by problems related to accessing financing, while firms that were previously indebted find
that this factor affected them more negatively. This is in line with the findings in the
previous section that more indebted companies are more likely to ask for loans with public
guarantees (ICOs). Supply disruptions affect less negatively large and more productive
firms, while firms with larger cash holdings find this factor affects them more negatively.
Increased competition affects less negatively large, indebted and productive firms.
5.1 The role of uncertainty
The COVID-19 shock brought about an unprecedented increase in uncertainty. The
sources of this uncertainty are wide ranging. First, on the epidemiological side, uncertain-
ties include the infectiousness of the virus, the development and effectiveness of vaccines,
the magnitude of the successive waves of COVID-19, the appearance of new virus strains
and the duration and effectiveness of social distancing. Second, on the economic side, the
unprecedented nature of the shock creates an uncertain outlook related to the short-term
impact of containment measures on business activity, the policy measures and their im-
pact on the economy, the speed of the recovery and the changes in households’ spending
patterns, among others. Because of this, as shown in the previous section, firms perceive
uncertainty as the main factor affecting negatively their activity.
We begin the analysis of heterogeneity running the same regression as before, equa-
tion 1, but adding now a set of week dummies (in order to control for the response date
as new information about the evolution of pandemic may affect the perception of uncer-
tainty) and the year-on-year change in turnover (in order to account for the magnitude
of the firm-specific shock that may also affect the perception of uncertainty). Results are
shown in Table 5. We use as dependent variable the responses dealing with uncertainty
from question 5 we used in the previous section, i.e. using dummies that take the value
1 if the firm perceives that economic and policy uncertainty affected negatively their ac-
tivity (columns (1) and (2) respectively of Table 5). We complement it with the answers
to question 8, which reads ‘When will your firm’s activity return to pre-crisis levels? ’.
We construct a dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm replied ‘too uncertain’ to this
question, and zero otherwise. The regression with this variable as dependent variable is
shown in column (3) of Table 5.
Turning to uncertainty associated to the pandemic and to policy measures (columns
(1) and (2), respectively), it is surprising that there are no significant differences on
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observable characteristics across firms within each sector-region-week triplet beyond the
size of the shock. This finding implies that all firms are equally exposed to these sources of
uncertainty regardless of their characteristics once we control for the change in turnover.
Only the very large firms (+250 employees) show a lower concern about the economic
policy uncertainty. Regarding the length of the recovery (column (3)), only the size of
the shock (proxied by the year-on-year change in turnover) is associated to the presence
of too much uncertainty in the timing of the recovery. Within each sector, region and
week of response, old firms are also more prone to answer that uncertainty is too large to
provide a meaningful answer.
Summing up, once we control for the size of the shock (proxied by the change
in turnover), our results suggest that all firms were impacted homogeneously by the
uncertainty brought by the COVID-19 shock, since we find no significant differences across
firms’ observables in their perception of uncertainty.
6 The impact of the vaccine announcement on firms’
subjective recovery expectations
On November 9th 2020, Pfizer announced that their COVID-19 vaccine was 90%
effective in trials.10 The markets and most economic agents took these news as an indica-
tion of the pandemic being closer to an end, stocks market spiked,11 and news all over the
world spread the word that the end of the COVID-19 pandemic was a bit closer. Figure 5
shows the interest in the word vaccine (and related words) on Google searches during the
period the survey was open. We can observe a clear spike on the 9th of November, the
day the vaccine was announced, which supports the exogeneity of the shock. Our survey
was conducted between the 5th and the 18th of November 2020, so we use the fact that
Pfizer’s announcement was made while the survey was open as an identification strategy
to provide causal evidence of the impact of the announcement of the vaccine on firms’
recovery expectations.12
To this end, we use again question 8, which asks when the firm will recover pre-
pandemic activity levels, in order to create two different expected recovery measures to
use as dependent variable (yit). First, a dummy taking value 1 when the firm reports a
10The announcement was made in the afternoon in Europe.
11Daily returns in Europe on November 9th 2020: IBEX 35 (+8.57%), DAX (+4.94%), CAC 40
(+7.57%), FTSE 100 (+4.67%), Euro Stoxx 50 (+6.42%).
12Figure 10 of Appendix A.1 shows the responses received by day.
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Figure 5: Google searches of the word ‘vaccine’
Source: GoogleTrends.
Notes: The figure shows the ‘regional interest’ in Spain of the searches vaccine, pfizer vaccine, vacuna and vacuna pfizer
(the two latter are the Spanish translations of the former). Regional interest is computed by Google as a proportion of all
searches on all topics on Google at that time and location, normalized so that 100 is the maximum.
full recovery by the end of 2021. Second, an ordinal variable that captures the timing
of the recovery, taking values 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 if the firm expects recovery “already”, in
2020, 2021, 2022 and later than 2022, respectively (excluding firms that answered ‘too
uncertain’ and ‘already recovered ’).
In order to estimate the impact of the vaccine news on these firm-level recovery
expectations proxies, we consider the following regression:
yit = α + ϕvaccineit + β
′Xi + γs,j + εit, (2)
where the regressor of interest, vaccinei,t, takes the value of 1 if the firm submitted its
response after the vaccine news on November 9th and 0 otherwise. We also introduce
a set of controls Xi, which includes change in turnover, size, productivity, temporary
workers’ share, intangible assets share, rural/urban dummy, cash ratio and indebtedness;
and a full set of week and sector-region FE (γs,j). Identification is based on comparing
firms with the same observable characteristics operating in the same sector and region,
but answering before the vaccine announcement on Nov 9th (control group) and those
interviewed after the announcement (treatment group).
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Figure 6: Average of responses before and after the vaccine announcement.
Source: EBAE survey and Central de Balances.
Notes: Average response pre-vaccine (0) and post-vaccine (1) with the 90% confidence interval, of the variables proxying
recovery expectations (recovery timing and recovery i 2021 ), the size of the shock received (proxi d by the decrease n
turnover) and the main firm characteristics (employment, age and TFP). All the variables are normalized so that the
average response on the day of the vaccine announcement takes the value 1.
Figure 6 shows the average response pre-vaccine (0) and post-vaccine (1) with the
90% confidence interval, of the variables proxying recovery expectations (recovery timing
and recovery in 2021 ), the size of the shock received (proxied by the decrease in turnover)
and the main firm characteristics (employment, age and TFP). We can observe that
firms were more likely to respond that they expected to have recovered by 2021 after
the announcement of the vaccine, and that they expected a shorter time for recovery.
However, firm characteristics are in general not significantly different before and after the
vaccine. To further ease concerns that firms responding later in the survey might have
different characteristics, and this might be driving the results, we regress the dummy
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vaccin i,t on each of the regressors of interest adding a full set of sector-region fixed
effe ts (see Table 6). We fi d that all of them have o significant correlation wi h th
timing of the response (with e excep ion of the cash ratio, which has a positive and
significant coefficient), hence pointing at the pool of firms responding before and after the
announcement of the vaccine to have the same ex-ante characteristics. Nonetheless we
control by all firm observables and the size of the shock received when running equation (2)
to minimize any possible concern regarding the correlation of the timing of the response
with any firm-level characteristics.
Table 6: Relationship of the timing of response to survey with the regressors of interest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ Temp. Intang. Debt Cash Log
Turnover TFP Age workers share ratio ratio Empl.
vaccine 0.79 -0.03 -0.07 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.03*** 0.04
(1.06) (0.02) (0.87) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.08)
Obs 2,119 2,119 2,119 2,119 2,119 2,119 2,119 2,119
R2 0.37 0.62 0.24 0.34 0.26 0.18 0.21 0.30
Sect-reg FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Source: EBAE survey and Central de Balances.
Notes: Outcomes of regressing the dummy variable vaccinei,t individually on the Y-o-Y change in
turnover, proxy for the size of the shock (column 1), TFP (column 2), age (column 3), share of
temporary workers (column 4), share of intangible assets (column 5), debt ratio (column 6), cash ratio
(column 7) and log employment (column 8). All columns include full set of sector-region fixed effects.
Region-sector clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7 shows the main results.13 Column (1) shows that firms answering after the
announcement date of the vaccine report a significantly higher probability of full recovery
expectations by the end of 2021 than firms answering before, even after accounting for
firm characteristics within the same sector-region pair. Answering after the vaccine an-
nouncement increases the probability of expected recovery by the end of 2021 in 6.6 pp.
Since the average of the dependent variable is 20%, it means that the expected probability
would increase from 20% to 26.6% in the average firm as a result of the announcement.
This effect is equivalent in magnitude to the effect of a change in turnover (size of the
shock) of 16.5 pp. (0.06 / 0.004).
Column (2) runs the same regression as column (1), but adding a linear time trend
13Figure 15 of Appendix B shows all the coefficients of Table 7.
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vaccinei,t on each of the regressors of interest adding a full set of sector-region fixed
effects (see Table 6). We find that all of them have no significant correlation with the
timing of the response (with the exception of the cash ratio, which has a positive and
significant coefficient), hence pointing at the pool of firms responding before and after the
announcement of the vaccine to have the same ex-ante characteristics. Nonetheless we
control by all firm observables and the size of the shock received when running equation (2)
to minimize any possible concern regarding the correlation of the timing of the response
with any firm-level characteristics.
Table 6: Relationship of the timing of response to survey with the regressors of interest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ Temp. Intang. Debt Cash Log
Turnover TFP Age workers share ratio ratio Empl.
vaccine 0.79 -0.03 -0.07 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.03*** 0.04
(1.06) (0.02) (0.87) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.08)
Obs 2,119 2,119 2,119 2,119 2,119 2,119 2,119 2,119
R2 0.37 0.62 0.24 0.34 0.26 0.18 0.21 0.30
Sect-reg FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Source: EBAE survey and Central de Balances.
Notes: Outcomes of regressing the dummy variable vaccinei,t individually on the Y-o-Y change in
turnover, proxy for the size of the shock (column 1), TFP (column 2), age (column 3), share of
temporary workers (column 4), share of intangible assets (column 5), debt ratio (column 6), cash ratio
(column 7) and log employment (column 8). All columns include full set of sector-region fixed effects.
Region-sector clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7 shows the main results.13 Column (1) shows that firms answering after the
announcement date of the vaccine report a significantly higher probability of full recovery
expectations by the end of 2021 than firms answering before, even after accounting for
firm characteristics within the same sector-region pair. Answering after the vaccine an-
nouncement increases the probability of expected recovery by the end of 2021 in 6.6 pp.
Since the average of the dependent variable is 20%, it means that the expected probability
would increase from 20% to 26.6% in the average firm as a result of the announcement.
This effect is equivalent in magnitude to the effect of a change in turnover (size of the
shock) of 16.5 pp. (0.06 / 0.004).
Column (2) runs the same regression as column (1), but adding a linear time trend
13Figure 15 of Appendix B shows all the coefficients of Table 7.
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Table 7: The impact of the COVID-19 vaccine on firms’ recovery expectations.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Recovery Recovery Recovery Recovery
2021 2021 2021 timing
vaccine 0.066*** 0.074* 0.0823*** -0.266***
(0.022) (0.042) (0.035) (0.090)
∆ turnover 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** -0.039***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 1,565 1,565 617 944
R2 0.263 0.263 0.276 0.482
Sample 4-19 Nov 4-19 Nov 6-12 Nov 4-19 Nov
Controls YES YES YES YES
SectXreg FE YES YES YES YES
Time trend NO YES NO NO
Source: EBAE survey and Central de Balances.
Notes: Outcomes of regression (2) using as dependent variable a dummy taking value 1 when the firm
reports a full recovery by the end of 2021 (columns 1, 2 and 3); an ordinal variable that captures the
timing of the recovery, taking values 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 if the firm expects recovery “already”, in 2020,
2021, 2022 and later than 2022, respectively (column 4). The variable vaccine takes the value 1 if the
firm replied after the vaccine announcement on November 9th 2020, and 0 otherwise. The regression
includes a full set of sector-region, controls for the size of the shock, proxied by the year-on-year change
in t rnover, and for all the observables we have been using in the previous sections: size, age, TFP,
rural status, temporary workers, intangible share, debt and cash ratio. Column 2 also includes a linear
time trend. Region-sector clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
to capture any trend in recovery expectations other than the vaccine announcement.14
We see that the coefficient is still significant and of similar magnitude. Since other news
while the survey was taking place might have also impacted firms’ recovery expectations,
we narrow down the time span and consider only responses submitted three days before
and three days after the announcement date, i.e. between November 06 and 12. Column
(3) shows that the impact is still positive and significant, and even of larger magnitude.
Column (4) of Table 7 shows the impact of the vaccine announcement on the timing of the
recovery. The coefficient is negative and significant, meaning that firms expect a shorter
recovery time after the vaccine announcement.
14The linear time trend is added to control for any trends brought by other information about the
evolution of pandemic that may affect the recovery expectations. This time trend is a variable that takes
the value 1 for the first day of the survey, 2 for the second, and so on. Since there are two weekends in
our sample, we assign the (very few) responses received on weekends to Friday, and take into account
only work days (from Monday to Friday).
26
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Recovery Recovery Recovery Recovery
2021 2 21 2021 timing
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timing of the recov ry, taking values 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 if the firm expects recovery “already”, in 2020,
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firm replied after the vaccine announcement on November 9th 2020, and 0 otherwise. The regression
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We see that the coefficient is still significant and of similar magnitude. Since other news
while the survey was taking place might have also impacted firms’ recovery expectations,
we narrow down the time span and consider only responses submitted three days before
and three days after the announcement date, i.e. between November 06 and 12. Column
(3) shows that the impact is still positive and significant, and even of larger magnitude.
Column (4) of Table 7 shows the impact of the vaccine announcement on the timing of the
recovery. The coefficient is negative and significant, meaning that firms expect a shorter
recovery time after the vaccine announcement.
14The linear time trend is added to control for any trends brought by other information about the
evolution of pandemic that may affect the recovery expectations. This time trend is a variable that takes
the value 1 for the first day of the survey, 2 for the second, and so on. Since there are two weekends in
our sample, we assign the (very few) responses received on weekends to Friday, and take into account
only work days (from Monday to Friday).
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vaccinei,t on each of the regressors of interest adding a full set of sector-region fixed
effects (see Table 6). We find that all of them have no significant correlation with the
timing of the response (with the exception f the cash ratio, which has a positive and
significant coefficient), hence pointing at the pool of firms responding before and after the
announcement of the vaccine to have the same ex-ante characteristics. Nonetheless we
control by all firm observables and the size of th shock rec ived when unning equation (2)
to minimize any possible concern regarding the correlation of the timing of the response
with any firm-level characteristics.
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Table 7 shows the main results.13 Column (1) shows that firms answering after the
announcement date of the vaccine report a significantly higher probability of full recovery
expectations by the end of 2021 than firms answering before, even after accounting for
firm characteristics within the same sector-region pair. Answering after the vaccine an-
nouncement increases the probability of expected recovery by the end of 2021 in 6.6 pp.
Since the average of the dependent variable is 20%, it means that the expected probability
would increase from 20% to 26.6% in the average firm as a result of the announcement.
This effect is equivalent in magnitude to the effect of a change in turnover (size of the
shock) of 16.5 pp. (0.06 / 0.004).
Column (2) runs the same regression as column (1), but adding a linear time trend
13Figure 15 of Appendix B shows all the coefficients of Table 7.
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to capture any trend in recovery expectations other than the vaccine announcement.14
We see that the coefficient is still significant and of similar magnitude. Since other news
while the survey was taking place might have also impacted firms’ recovery expectations,
we narrow down the time span and consider only responses submitted three days before
and three days after the announcement date, i.e. between November 06 and 12. Column
(3) shows that the impact is still positive and significant, and even of larger magnitude.
Column (4) of Table 7 shows the impact of the vaccine announcement on the timing of the
recovery. The coefficient is negative and significant, meaning that firms expect a shorter
recovery time after the vaccine announcement.
14The linear time trend is added to control for any trends brought by other information about the
evolution of pandemic that may affect the recovery expectations. This time trend is a variable that takes
the value 1 for the first day of the survey, 2 for the second, and so on. Since there are two weekends in
our sample, we assign the (very few) responses received on weekends to Friday, and take into account
only work days (from Monday to Friday).
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Summi g up, this section exploits he ann uncement of the effective ess of Pfizer’s
vaccin during the EBAE survey to show h t the vaccine announc ment increased re-
covery expectations of all firms, hence pro iding evidenc that du ing a pandemic firms
incorporate developments in the medical fi ld into their expectations formation.
7 Conclusions
The COVID-19 pandemic and its associated containment measures are causing an
unprecedented economic shock. The threat of COVID-19 poses many challenges for firms
in an uncertain and volatile envir nment. In particular, the COVID-19 shock is generating
negative cash flows for many firms, exhausting in some cases their liquidity stocks. In
case thes shorta es r sult in a significant incr ase of firm ins lvencies and bankruptcies,
their potential long-term effects on employment, investment, growth and prosperity are
a source of concern. Against this background, the objective of this paper is to provide a
better understanding of the firm-level heterogeneity in the impact of and response to the
COVID-19 shock, a matter of paramount importance.
Our first contribution is to exploit the Banco de España’s EBAE survey matched to
balance sheet data from Central de Balances in order to dig deeper into the heterogeneity
in the COVID-19 shock consequences across firms. We show that this impact was larger
in the case of small, young and less productive firms located in urban areas within each
sector-region pair. Firms did not translate fully the decrease in turnover experienced to
employment, and used relatively more the intensive margin (using temporary furlough
schemes - ERTEs) than the extensive margin (layoffs), with the exception of firms with
a high share of temporary workers. Small, young and less productive firms resorted rela-
tively more to public-guaranteed loans (ICO loans), tax deferrals, and furlough schemes
(ERTEs). More indebted companies, which were not hit relatively harder by the shock,
deemed public-guaranteed loans as very useful.
Our second contribution relates to firms’ perception regarding a) pandemic and
policy uncertainty, and b) recovery expectations. Uncertainty turns out to be the main
factor limiting firms’ activity. We show that uncertainty is crucial for all firms and that
observables cannot explain the differences in uncertainty perceptions once the shock is ac-
counted for. Given the timing of the survey, we use the announcement of the effectiveness
of the Pfizer vaccine on November 9th 2020 as a natural experiment to understand the
impact of the vaccine announcement on firms’ recovery expectations. We provide causal
evidence that this piece of news significantly improved the prospects of faster recovery
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factor limiting firms’ activity. We show that uncertainty is crucial for all firms and that
observables cannot explain the differences in uncertainty perceptions once the shock is ac-
counted for. Given the timing of the survey, we use the announcement of the effectiveness
of the Pfizer vaccine on November 9th 2020 as a natural experiment to understand the
impact of the vaccine announcement on firms’ recovery expectations. We provide causal
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of faster recovery under different set of measures, hence providing evidence that during
a pandemic firms incorporate developments in the medical field into their expectations
formation.
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Appendix
A. Survey
A.1. Coverage and representativeness
The survey was submitted to a sample of 12,940 Spanish non-financial corporations,
of which 46% cooperate regularly with the Banco de España’s Central Balance Sheet
Data Office (CBBE). The survey focuses on the non-financial market economy, hence,
we exclude firms in the following sectors: agriculture, utilities, financial services and
non-market services. Figure 7 show the sectoral distribution of the sample of firms that
received the survey compared to the one observed in the economy, using the information
from the Central Business Register (DIRCE in Spanish), available at the National Statis-
tics Institute (INE). It can be shown that the sectoral distribution of the sample partially
over-represents some sectors of the economy, mainly manufacturing, which reflects the
higher coverage of this sector in the CBBE.
Figure 7: Comparison of sectoral distribution in the original sample
Panel A: Sectoral distribution of firms in
the original sample
Panel B: Response rates by sector
Source: INE and Banco de España
Notes: Panel A shows the sectoral distribution of firms in the Spanish economy according to DIRCE (left column), and
the sectoral distribution of our original sample of firms from the EBAE survey (right column). Panel B shows the
response rate and the degree of collaboration with the CBBE by sector.
Out of these, we received 4,004 valid responses, which represents a response rate of
30,9%. As expected, the response rate was higher among the companies that collaborate
with the CBBE (49%) than among those that have not been collaborated to date (15.5%).
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Figure 8 compares the sectoral distribution of the final sample of the survey with the one
observed in DIRCE. There is some over-representation of the manufacturing sector (see
Panel A), which is slightly lower when we compare the employment distribution by sector
using the information from Social Security Registers (Panel B).
Figure 8: Comparison of sectoral distribution in the final sample
Panel A: Sectoral distribution of firms
Panel B: Sectoral distribution of employment
Source: INE, Ministry of Social Security and Banco de España
Notes: Panel A shows the sectoral distribution of firms in the Spanish economy according to DIRCE (left column), and
the sectoral distribution of our final sample of firms from the EBAE survey (right column). Panel B shows the sectoral
distribution of employment in the Spanish economy according to social security data (left column), and the sectoral
distribution of employment of our final sample of firms from the EBAE survey (right column).
Turning to representativeness in terms of firm size, the survey over-represents large
firms. In particular, the shares of very small (1-9 employees), small (10-49), medium (50-
249), and large (+250) firms in the sample are 36.5%, 40.2%, 18.5%, and 4.8%, respec-
tively. According to DIRCE, the corresponding shares in the population of Spanish firms
are 85.7%, 12.0%, 1.9%, and 0.4%. It is worth mentioning that this under-representation
of small firms is not a source of concern for our main results because of two reasons:
(i) Identification in our preferred specifications comes from variation within each sector-
region pair and size bin. For instance, in the case of impact of the shock, we compare
the drop in sales of two firms with different TFPs but operating in the same sector-region
and the same size category. (ii) Still, the concern could be that the survey over-represents
high-TFP / good firms within the small size categories because low-TFP / bad firms are
not even able to answer the survey properly or they are in distress. If this is the case, our
estimated differences could be considered a lower bound to the extent that these missing
firms are presumably more negatively affected by the COVID-19 shock.
In any event, survey responses aggregated at the sectoral and regional level capture
32
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 34 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2120
Figure 8 compares the sectoral distribution of the final sample of the survey with the one
observed in DIRCE. There is some over-representation of the manufacturing sector (see
Panel A), which is slightly lower when we compare the employment distribution by sector
using the information from Social Security Registers (Panel B).
Figure 8: Comparison of sectoral distribution in the final sample
Panel A: Sectoral distribution of firms
Panel B: Sectoral distribution of employment
Source: INE, Ministry of Social Security and Banco de España
Notes: Panel A shows the sectoral distribution of firms in the Spanish economy according to DIRCE (left column), and
the sectoral distribution of our final sample of firms from the EBAE survey (right column). Panel B shows the sectoral
distribution of employment in the Spanish economy according to social security data (left column), and the sectoral
distribution of employment of our final sample of firms from the EBAE survey (right column).
Turning to representativeness in terms of firm size, the survey over-represents large
firms. In particular, the shares of very small (1-9 employees), small (10-49), medium (50-
249), and large (+250) firms in the sample are 36.5%, 40.2%, 18.5%, and 4.8%, respec-
tively. According to DIRCE, the corresponding shares in the population of Spanish firms
are 85.7%, 12.0%, 1.9%, and 0.4%. It is worth mentioning that this under-representation
of small firms is not a source of concern for our main results because of two reasons:
(i) Identification in our preferred specifications comes from variation within each sector-
region pair and size bin. For instance, in the case of impact of the shock, we compare
the drop in sales of two firms with different TFPs but operating in the same sector-region
and the same size category. (ii) Still, the concern could be that the survey over-represents
high-TFP / good firms within the small size categories because low-TFP / bad firms are
not even able to answer the survey properly or they are in distress. If this is the case, our
estimated differences could be considered a lower bound to the extent that these missing
firms are presumably more negatively affected by the COVID-19 shock.
In any event, survey responses aggregated at the sectoral and regional level capture
32
Figure 9: Employment growth of final sample compared to other sources
Panel A: Employment growth by sector
P el B: Empl yment growth by province
Source: Ministry of Social Security and Banco de España
Notes: Panel A shows a scatterplot with 2-digit sector employment growth using the survey (x-axis), and social security
data (y-axis). Panel B shows a scatterplot with employment growth by province using the survey (x-axis), and social
security data (y-axis).
well the recent developments in the Spanish economy. For instance, Figure 9 shows that
survey figures on employment growth are highly correlated with those of other sources,
even at a high degree of disaggregation at the regional or the industry level. In particular,
the correlation between firm s responses to the year-on-year variation in employment and
the same rate provided by Social Security Registers is 0.6 at the province level and 0.7 at
the 2-digit industry level.
Figure 10 shows the number of responses by day. Panel A shows the responses by
natural day, and marks with a vertical red line the announcement of the Pfizer vaccine.
The 7th, 8th, 14th and 15th were weekends, and hence the number of responses these
days are very low. Panel B shows the number of responses by day, but not taking into
account these weekends, and assigning the very few responses on the weekend to that
Friday. Note in this figure we call 1 the first workday of the survey, 2 the second, and so
on. The announcement of the Pfizer vaccine was made on the 3rd weekday of the survey.
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Figure 10: Number of responses by day
Panel A: Responses by natural day
Panel B: Responses by working day
Source: EBAE
Notes: Panel A shows the number of responses received by day. Panel B shows the number of responses received by each
working day, assigning the very few responses during the weekend to the previous Friday. Vertical red line signals the
announcement of the Pfizer vaccine on the 9th November.
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A.2. Questionnaire
This appendix presents the questionnaire of the survey translated to English. The
original questionnaire (in Spanish) can be found here.
Recent evolution and perspectives 
            
1. Business turnover Significant decrease Decrease Unchanged Increase 
Significant 
increase 
How is your firm's turnover changing in 4Q20 
compared to 3Q20?           
How do you expect your firm's turnover to change in 
1Q20 compared to 4Q20?           
2. Employment Significant 
decrease 
Decrease Unchanged Increase 
Significant 
increase 
How is your firm's turnover changing in 4Q20 
compared to 3Q20?           
How do you expect your firm's employment to change 
over 1Q20 compared to 4Q20?           
3. Input prices Significant decrease Decrease Unchanged Increase 
Significant 
increase 
How is your firm's main input prices changing in 4Q20 
compared to 3Q20?           
How do you expect your firm's main input prices to 
change over 1Q20 compared to 4Q20?           
4. Output prices Significant decrease Decrease Unchanged Increase 
Significant 
increase 
How is your firm's output prices changing in 4Q20 
compared to 3Q20?           
How do you expect your firm's output prices to change 
over 1Q20 compared to 4Q20?           
            




Negative Neutral Positive 
Very 
positive 
Demand for its products and services           
Access to external financing           
Receivables to customers           
Regular supplier issues           
Availability of workforce           
Pressure from competition           
Uncertainty about the COVID-19 pandemic           
Economic policy uncertainty           
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Impact of COVID-19 
                      
6. Activity compared to 
pre-crisis levels 
Where is your firm's turnover and employment in the 4Q20 compared to the same period 
last year? 
  YoY decline Unchanged YoY increase 
  >50% 30-50% 15-30% 10-15% 5-10% 0-5% 0% 0-5% 5-10% >10% 
Turnover                     
Employment                     
 
7. Take-up of support measures 
Please indicate the extent to which you are 
currently using the following measures to cushion 
the impact of COVID-19 on your business     
  





relevant     
Work from home             
Greater use of online selling channels             
ERTE (short-term work support program)             
Layoffs or non-renewal of temporary contracts             
Wage adjustments             
Reduction of investment plans             
ICO (Public-guaranteed loans schemes)             
Other loans (non-ICO)             
Tax deferral             
Renegotiation or deferral of rental contracts             
              
8. End of the crisis already is 2020 2021 2022 later than 2022 
too 
uncertain 
When will your firm's activity return to pre-crisis 
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B. Robustness
Table 8: Summary statistics by sector for sample used in regressions.
PANEL A
Averages ∆ ∆ log Age Rural Temp. Intangible Debt Size Cash
Turnover Emp TFP Workers capital Ratio (Emp) ratio
Manufacturing -12.80 -5.49 1.28 29.25 0.44 0.12 0.07 0.31 136.40 0.12
Construction -13.06 -6.02 1.20 23.15 0.26 0.30 0.05 0.27 55.21 0.16
Trade -15.51 -7.73 0.84 26.87 0.27 0.13 0.07 0.31 70.20 0.13
Transport -16.31 -8.15 1.98 24.73 0.29 0.20 0.08 0.36 134.71 0.14
Hospitality -47.93 -37.78 0.94 21.52 0.28 0.29 0.05 0.37 45.54 0.16
IT services -9.21 -3.83 1.56 19.46 0.08 0.15 0.35 0.22 100.69 0.22
Real estate -12.78 -4.72 1.11 26.58 0.12 0.04 0.02 0.21 10.57 0.12
Prof. services -11.43 -5.74 1.73 19.65 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.24 50.55 0.25
Admin. services -17.00 -13.47 1.79 18.53 0.15 0.20 0.15 0.35 122.30 0.19
Other services -34.17 -19.32 1.36 20.51 0.15 0.24 0.11 0.29 67.06 0.22
Total -16.86 -9.34 1.25 24.98 0.28 0.17 0.09 0.30 86.43 0.15
Obs 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715
PANEL B
IQRs ∆ ∆ log Age Rural Temp. Intangible Debt Size Cash
Turnover Emp TFP Workers capital Ratio (Emp) ratio
Manufacturing 22.50 7.50 0.19 17.00 1.00 0.16 0.03 0.44 63.00 0.15
Construction 22.50 7.50 0.33 16.00 1.00 0.47 0.01 0.44 34.59 0.20
Trade 22.50 7.50 0.17 17.00 1.00 0.18 0.03 0.53 36.25 0.17
Transport 22.50 7.50 0.35 15.00 1.00 0.29 0.01 0.53 47.88 0.16
Hospitality 20.00 47.50 0.23 18.00 1.00 0.29 0.01 0.58 35.09 0.19
IT services 12.50 2.50 0.46 12.00 0.00 0.20 0.76 0.41 72.12 0.33
Real estate 22.50 0.00 0.61 16.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 5.00 0.15
Prof. services 22.50 2.50 0.34 12.00 0.00 0.15 0.13 0.41 29.70 0.34
Admin. services 40.00 22.50 0.55 16.00 0.00 0.31 0.07 0.64 56.50 0.27
Other services 52.50 40.00 0.50 13.00 0.00 0.31 0.03 0.60 50.75 0.27
Total 22.50 12.50 0.63 17.00 1.00 0.24 0.03 0.51 43.00 0.20
Obs 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715
Source: EBAE survey and Central de Balances Integrada.
Notes: This table keeps only the 2,715 observations that are later used in the regression analysis, which are the
observations for which we have data on all the variables of interest. Panel A shows the averages and Panel B the
interquantile ranges (measured as p75-p25 within the industry). The first column of both tables corresponds to yearly
change in turnover, and the second column to the yearly change in employment. Column 3, 4 and 5 correspond to log
TFP, age of the firm, and the dummy variable indicating the headquarters are in rural areas. Column 6 shows the share of
temporary workers. Column 7, 8 and 10 show the share of intangible capital (intangible capital over total capital), the
debt ratio (total debt over total assets), and the cash ratio (cash over total assets) respectively. Column 9 shows size,
measured by the number of employees.
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Table 9: Summary statistics weighted
PANEL A
Averages ∆ ∆ log Age Rural Temp. Intangible Debt Size Cash
Turnover Emp TFP Workers capital Ratio (Emp) ratio
Manufacturing -18.93 -10.29 1.29 25.36 0.50 0.12 0.03 0.29 25.50 0.15
Construction -15.33 -6.33 1.22 21.97 0.25 0.24 0.04 0.25 12.19 0.18
Trade -17.10 -8.90 0.85 21.19 0.32 0.10 0.05 0.31 10.99 0.15
Transport -14.62 -5.56 1.99 20.04 0.29 0.17 0.08 0.27 17.89 0.17
Hospitality -43.82 -34.27 0.91 18.51 0.38 0.29 0.05 0.36 10.29 0.18
IT services -12.41 -4.44 1.65 18.08 0.14 0.20 0.24 0.18 30.49 0.23
Real estate -13.21 -4.02 1.10 25.67 0.14 0.03 0.01 0.21 3.69 0.12
Prof. services -11.30 -5.06 1.75 18.43 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.19 10.78 0.30
Admin. services -20.00 -15.47 1.84 18.37 0.18 0.14 0.09 0.30 40.30 0.20
Other services -34.00 -19.03 1.47 18.63 0.14 0.23 0.15 0.26 9.18 0.24
Total -22.49 -13.57 1.20 20.71 0.30 0.16 0.06 0.29 14.13 0.18
Obs 3,523 3,457 3,161 3,584 3,584 3,160 3,584 3,584 3,584 3,582
PANEL B
IQRs ∆ ∆ log Age Rural Temp. Intangible Debt Size Cash
Turnover Emp TFP Workers capital Ratio (Emp) ratio
Manufacturing 37.50 12.50 0.29 16.00 1.00 0.17 0.01 0.47 16.31 0.20
Construction 22.50 2.50 0.39 15.00 1.00 0.46 0.00 0.43 9.00 0.23
Trade 40.00 7.50 0.19 18.00 1.00 0.15 0.01 0.58 6.00 0.19
Transport 22.50 2.50 0.44 16.00 1.00 0.26 0.01 0.49 7.00 0.21
Hospitality 20.00 52.50 0.22 15.00 1.00 0.42 0.01 0.67 5.91 0.18
IT services 22.50 2.50 0.56 16.00 0.00 0.20 0.50 0.39 20.58 0.33
Real estate 22.50 0.00 0.65 15.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 2.00 0.15
Prof. services 22.50 0.00 0.34 14.00 0.00 0.12 0.03 0.31 4.88 0.39
Admin. services 40.00 40.00 0.50 17.00 0.00 0.22 0.01 0.57 16.04 0.27
Other services 52.50 40.00 0.41 18.00 0.00 0.32 0.03 0.37 6.14 0.29
Total 40.00 22.50 0.68 17.00 1.00 0.24 0.01 0.52 6.70 0.24
Obs 3,523 3,457 3,161 3,584 3,584 3,160 3,584 3,584 3,584 3,582
Source: EBAE survey and Central de Balances Integrada.
Notes: This table keeps only the 2,715 observations that are later used in the regression analysis, which are the
observations for which we have data on all the variables of interest. We use 60 size-sector grids to compute elevation
weights that match the distributional data from the Social Security dataset. Panel A shows the averages and Panel B the
interquantile ranges (measured as p75-p25 within the industry. The first column of both tables corresponds to yearly
change in turnover, and the second column to the yearly change in employment. Column 3, 4 and 5 correspond to log
TFP, age of the firm, and the dummy variable indicating the headquarters are in rural areas. Column 6 shows the share of
temporary workers. Column 7, 8 and 10 show the share of intangible capital (intangible capital over total capital), the
debt ratio (total debt over total assets), and the cash ratio (cash over total assets) respectively. Column 9 shows size,
measured by the number of employees.
38
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 40 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2120
Table 10: Impact of the COVID-19 shocks on firms.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Sales Sales Emp. Emp.
TFP 4.74*** 1.58 2.04** 1.04
(1.20) (1.17) (1.01) (0.86)
Age 0.08** 0.04 0.04 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Rural 3.29*** 2.56*** 1.52 1.21
(1.08) (0.90) (0.93) (0.79)
Temporary workers -8.93*** 1.57 -7.87*** -5.44***
(2.74) (1.83) (1.88) (1.64)
Intangible share 0.09 -1.81 1.82 1.30
(1.95) (1.72) (1.60) (1.54)
Debt ratio -2.00 0.85 0.45 1.02
(1.72) (1.39) (1.32) (1.21)
Cash ratio -3.48 -2.29 3.30* 3.02*
(2.92) (2.40) (1.84) (1.71)
10-50 emp. 1.09 1.57* 0.06 0.66
(1.08) (0.90) (0.94) (0.80)
50-250 emp. 6.42*** 4.25*** 2.73** 2.79***
(1.49) (1.14) (1.10) (0.94)
+250 emp. 6.77*** 6.95*** 5.21*** 4.49***















Tax deferrals -1.31 0.38
(1.02) (0.86)
Observations 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715
R2 0.04 0.49 0.39 0.51
Response controls NO YES NO YES
SectXreg FE YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: EBAE survey and Central de Balances.
Notes: Outcomes of regression (1) using as dependent variable the reported year-on-year change in
turnover (columns 1-2) and the reported year-on-year change in employment (columns 3-4) from
question 6. Column 2 and 4 include as controls the responses to question 7. All regressions include a
full set of sector-region fixed effects.
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Table 11: Impact of the COVID-19 shocks on firms - Further mechanisms.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sales Sales Sales Emp. Emp. Emp.
Average annual sales growth 2017-2019 0.02 0.00
(0.02) (0.02)
TFP 2.90** 1.98 2.89** 2.04** 1.78* 1.97**
(1.23) (1.21) (1.23) (1.01) (1.01) (0.99)
Age 0.05* 0.06* 0.05* 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Rural 2.71*** 2.49** 2.70*** 1.52 1.22 1.49
(0.97) (0.98) (0.97) (0.93) (0.93) (0.92)
Temporary workers -1.00 -1.57 -0.99 -7.87*** -7.97*** -7.83***
(2.16) (2.20) (2.16) (1.88) (1.87) (1.87)
Intangible share -1.34 -1.82 -1.36 1.82 1.91 1.73
(1.83) (1.93) (1.83) (1.60) (1.66) (1.60)
Debt ratio -0.26 -0.52 -0.25 0.45 0.06 0.50
(1.53) (1.57) (1.53) (1.32) (1.34) (1.33)
Cash ratio -1.22 -0.40 -1.08 3.30* 3.85** 4.13**
(2.55) (2.44) (2.53) (1.84) (1.83) (1.83)
10-50 emp. 1.16 1.51 1.21 0.06 0.09 0.41
(1.04) (1.06) (1.05) (0.94) (0.98) (0.94)
50-250 emp. 4.96*** 5.19*** 5.01*** 2.73** 2.75** 3.04***
(1.38) (1.37) (1.39) (1.10) (1.10) (1.09)
+250 emp. 8.53*** 8.77*** 8.56*** 5.21*** 5.28*** 5.39***
(2.28) (2.29) (2.29) (1.52) (1.55) (1.50)
Capital intensity 0.01 0.07***
(0.03) (0.02)
Observations 2,715 2,641 2,715 2,715 2,641 2,715
R-squared 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.39
Sector FE NO NO NO NO NO NO
Region FE NO NO NO NO NO NO
SectXreg FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Source: EBAE survey and Central de Balances.
Notes: Outcomes of regression (1) using as dependent variable the reported year-on-year change in turnover (columns 1-3)
and the reported year-on-year change in employment (columns 4-6) from question 6. Columns (1) and (4) are analogous
to column (4) and (8) of Table 2, respectively. All regressions include a full set of sector-region fixed effects.
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Source: EBAE survey and Central de Balances.
Notes: Outcomes of regression (1) using as dependent variable the firm absorption capacity, computed as follows. First,
we regress the employment change on turnover change, and second we compute the absorption capacity as the inverse of
the residual from that regression, which could be interpreted as a measure of the ability of firms to cushion the turnover
shock.Regressions includes a full set of sector-region fixed effects.
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Temporary workers -7.87*** -6.63***
(1.88) (1.37)
Intangible share 1.82 2.50*
(1.60) (1.30)
Debt ratio 0.45 0.64
(1.32) (1.05)
Cash ratio 3.30* 4.09***
(1.84) (1.54)
10-50 emp. 0.06 -0.65
(0.94) (0.77)
50-250 emp. 2.73** 0.30
(1.10) (0.84)




Sector FE NO NO
Region FE NO NO
SectXreg FE YES YES
Source: EBAE survey and Central de Balances.
Notes: Outcomes of regression (1) using as dependent variable the reported year-on-year change in employment from
question 6. Columns (1) is analogous to column (8) of Table 2. Column (2) adds the year-on-year change in employment
from question 6 and its square. All regressions include a full set of sector-region fixed effects.
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Table 14: Responses of firms to COVID-19 shock.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
WfH e-COMM Invest. Firing ERTEs ICOs Taxes Rentals
TFP -0.00 -0.06** -0.04 -0.00 -0.03 -0.07** -0.02 -0.06**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Age -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Rural -0.06*** -0.02 0.08*** 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Temporary workers -0.22*** -0.07* -0.06 0.17*** 0.04 0.16*** 0.08* 0.09**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Intangible share 0.17*** 0.06 0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.00 0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
Debt ratio -0.05 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.32*** 0.06* 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Cash ratio -0.07 0.04 -0.05 -0.00 -0.07 -0.39*** -0.26*** 0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
10-50 emp. 0.04* 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.08*** 0.05** -0.05* -0.05**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
50-250 emp. 0.19*** 0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.10*** -0.01 -0.15*** -0.05*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
+250 emp. 0.30*** -0.01 0.07 0.00 0.10** -0.27*** -0.19*** -0.09**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
∆ Turnover 0.00* -0.00 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715
R2 0.33 0.19 0.22 0.26 0.35 0.28 0.26 0.25
SectXreg FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Source: EBAE survey and Central de Balances.
Notes: Outcomes of regression (1) using as dependent variable a dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm perceives as
very relevant or relevant working from home schemes (WfH - column 1), e-commerce (e-COMM - column 2), reduction in
investment (Invest - column 5), firing of workers (Firing - column 4), furlough schemes (ERTEs - column 5),
state-guaranteed credit (ICOs - column 6), tax deferrals (Tax def. - column 7), and renegotiation of rental contracts
(Rentals - column 8). The regressions here are analogous to Table 3 and 4, with the sole difference that we are further
controlling for the size of the shock, proxied by the change in turnover.The regression includes a full set of sector-region
fixed effects.
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Table 15: The impact of the COVID-19 vaccine on firms’ recovery expectations.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Recovery Recovery Recovery Recovery
2021 2021 2021 timing
vaccine 0.066*** 0.074* 0.083** -0.266***
(0.022) (0.042) (0.035) (0.090)
∆ turnover 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** -0.039***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
TFP 0.020 0.020 0.013 -0.163
(0.039) (0.039) (0.060) (0.111)
Age -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Temporary workers 0.020 0.020 0.003 -0.204
(0.068) (0.068) (0.105) (0.206)
Intangible share 0.028 0.029 0.109 0.204
(0.063) (0.063) (0.108) (0.161)
Debt ratio 0.010 0.010 -0.013 -0.207
(0.044) (0.044) (0.067) (0.137)
Cash ratio -0.048 -0.048 -0.000 -0.676**
(0.072) (0.072) (0.105) (0.268)
10-50 emp. 0.028 0.027 -0.011 0.122
(0.026) (0.026) (0.045) (0.112)
50-250 emp. 0.034 0.034 0.039 0.024
(0.030) (0.031) (0.054) (0.137)
+250 emp. 0.091* 0.091* 0.091 0.447**
(0.055) (0.055) (0.094) (0.184)
Time trend -0.001
(0.005)
Observations 1,565 1,565 617 944
R2 0.263 0.263 0.276 0.482
Controls YES YES YES YES
SectXreg FE YES YES YES YES
Time trend NO YES NO NO
Source: EBAE survey and Central de Balances.
Notes: Outcomes of regression (2) using as dependent variable a dummy taking value 1 when the firm reports a full
recovery by the end of 2021 (columns 1, 2 and 3); an ordinal variable that captures the timing of the recovery, taking
values 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 if the firm expects recovery “already”, in 2020, 2021, 2022 and later than 2022, respectively (column
4). The variable vaccine takes the value 1 if the firm replied after the vaccine announcement on November 9th 2020, and
0 otherwise. The regression includes a full set of sector-region, controls for the size of the shock, proxied by the
year-on-year change in turnover, and for all the observables we have been using in the previous sections: size, age, TFP,
rural status, temporary workers, intangible share, debt and cash ratio. Column 2 also includes a linear time trend.
Region-sector clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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C. Heterogeneity in factors affecting firms’ activity as
a result of the COVID-19 shock
Table 16: Factors affecting firms’ activity as a result of the Covid-19 shock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Demand Financing Unpaid rec. Supply Workers Competition
TFP -0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.05*** -0.02 -0.05*
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Age 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Rural -0.09*** -0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.02 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Temporary workers 0.01 0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.07* 0.05
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Intangible share 0.00 -0.03 0.07 0.03 -0.04 0.02
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06)
Debt ratio -0.01 0.07** -0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.06*
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Cash ratio 0.05 0.03 -0.13** 0.10** 0.04 -0.05
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07)
10-50 emp. -0.02 -0.04* 0.03 -0.02 -0.00 -0.03
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
50-250 emp. -0.04 -0.09*** 0.04 -0.05** -0.01 -0.07**
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
+250 emp. -0.11* -0.14*** 0.00 -0.11*** -0.02 -0.14***
(0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Observations 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715
R2 0.20 0.20 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16
SectXreg FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: EBAE survey and Central de Balances.
Notes: Outcomes of regression (1) using as dependent variable a dummy that takes the value 1 if the factor affected firms’
activity negatively or very negatively, where these factors are: demand disruptions (column 1), problems accessing
financing (column 2), unpaid receivables (column 3), supply disruptions (column 4), availability of workers (c), and
competition pressures (column 6). The regression includes a full set of sector-region fixed effects.
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